The Histories

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&
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Welcome to The Histories. As a student run academic journal, The Histories seeks to highlight the historical research that is being conducted by the students of La Salle University. In addition, this publication seeks to further expand historical awareness both here on campus and in the LaSallian community at large. In the succeeding pages, therefore, you, the reader, will find a set of essays which are of high-quality and first-rate scholarship.

The historical topics covered in this issue are wide-ranging. Among the four articles contained herein, there is an intriguing assessment of the involvement of baseball legend, “Shoeless Joe” Jackson in the fix of the 1919 World Series, an in depth comparison of three different works on the topic of World War II, a detailed examination of Dean Acheson’s role in the formation of American foreign policy from 1947 to 1950, and finally, an overview of the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement and its impact on American culture.

My sincere thanks to several people who have helped this journal come to print. First, to our moderator, Dr. Lisa Jarvinen, as well as the chair of the History Department, Dr. Stuart Leibiger, and all of the exceptional faculty members of the History Department for their unwavering support of this journal and the Historical Society as a whole. Second, to the talented writers who contributed their papers to this edition. Next, to all of the dedicated members of the Historical Society. And last but certainly not least, we are grateful to Chris Kazmierczak for providing us with the financial assistance necessary to get this journal published.

In parting, I would like to say that I have thoroughly enjoyed my time as Editor of this journal. The job was challenging at times, but the end product always made the hard work worthwhile. I know that this publication will continue to thrive in the hands of its newest Editor, Lauren De Angelis, in whom I have the utmost confidence.

I do hope you, the reader, find this edition of The Histories to be both an informative and pleasant experience. Have a wonderful summer!

Victoria L. Valusek
Editor-in-Chief
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Writers: Paul Orzechowski, Kevin Prendergast, Victoria Valusek, and Julia Walsh

Moderators: Dr. Lisa Jarvinen and Dr. Stuart Leibiger

*The picture on the front cover is of the Schuylkill River on a beautiful day in May 1968.
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The greatest legend in baseball history is considered by most to be Babe Ruth. It is fitting that Ruth modeled his swing off the only player who is as much a legend as himself. Much like “The Babe,” this man is known to history by a nickname: “Shoeless” Joe Jackson. Ironically, the pure swing of this baseball outlaw helped create the savior of baseball, Babe Ruth. In recent years, Jackson has become one of the most interesting and written about players in baseball history. His story is characterized by myths and undisclosed truths, ranging from the origin of his nickname, “Shoeless Joe” to the oft quoted child’s request “Say it ain’t so Joe!” (regarding Jackson’s involvement in the Black Sox Scandal). These myths serve as testimony to his legendary status in the history of the game of baseball.

The questions surrounding Jackson’s involvement in the fix of the 1919 World Series are often answered differently based upon little more than assumptions. He is often defended by adoring fans. They believe, for different reasons, that he was unjustly banned from baseball. Some claim that other prominent baseball figures, such as the White Sox owner Charles Comiskey and American League President Ban Johnson, are just as responsible yet, find themselves in the Hall of Fame. Still others believe that Jackson is completely innocent of being involved in the fix, simply a victim of the situation, too dim to know what he signed up for or deny he signed up at all. The truth lies somewhere in between Jackson’s innocence and Comiskey’s guilt. The quest for these answers begins with his poor childhood which was, like most in the 1890s, filled with work instead of school and play.

Deep in the back country of northwestern South Carolina, in Pickens County, Joe Jackson was born to George and Martha Jackson on July 16, 1888.

1 Here he was raised on his family’s sharecropper farm until hard times hit. In 1894, Joe’s father moved the family to the new mill town of Brandon Mills. At the age of six, Joe went to work with his father in the cotton mills where he would soon pick up baseball and start his illustrious career.

Joe was paid between 25 and 50 cents per day while his father received the adult wage of $1.25 per day. By the age of thirteen, Joe began playing on the mill’s baseball team. Teams were used by the mills as an activity to bring communities closer together as
well as to keep workers content. The mill owners certainly believed that this worked in view of the fact that they paid their players $2.50 per game. This was twice the payment for an entire day of work in the factory.

Joe earned a starting spot almost immediately as a pitcher, but he would not be used in that position for long. One day he threw a ball so hard he hit and broke the arm of a batter. After this incident, no one would bat against him and he pitched infrequently for the rest of his career. His talents eventually found their way to the outfield where he could focus on his tremendous natural hitting ability. For several more years, Joe would play ball for different mills, chasing after the best payment offered and quickly becoming noticed by pro and semi pro scouts. In 1908, the manager of the class D Greenville Spinners and former professional player, Tom Stouch, offered Jackson seventy-five dollars per month to play for his team, twice what he was getting at the mill.²

It was in Greenville where Joe’s professional career started and where he would eventually earn his famous nickname. He demanded immediate attention through his first game which included a double, triple, and home run. Later that year, while playing a game in the outfield, his new shoes began giving his feet trouble in the form of severe blisters and searing pain. Once at bat, he took off his shoes and stepped to the plate. He drove a triple to the outfield and when he pulled into third base a fan yelled, “You Shoeless Son of a Gun you!” The nickname stuck for the rest of his life even though he never again played without shoes.³

On August 22 of the same year, the Philadelphia Athletics announced that they had purchased Joe Jackson’s contract from the Spinners for $325. He joined the team after the Spinner’s season ended.⁴ His time in Philadelphia was filled with bitterness and hostility between the veteran players and himself. After two years of trying to fit him in, Connie Mack traded him to the Cleveland Naps. In Cleveland, Joe and his wife Katie settled in comfortably for five years. He hit .408 in his rookie season, becoming the first player to hit .400 as a rookie. The fans quickly fell in love with both his hitting and fielding. After five years of success in Cleveland, he was traded to Chicago where he would find similar success, but also the demise of his baseball career.

After Comiskey purchased Joe’s contract for $65,000, it seemed he had no money to pay his players. He was the stingiest owner in the league and regularly denied players much deserved raises. Somehow the public did not see this side of him and nicknamed him “the Noblest Roman of Them All.”⁵ In 1919, Detroit’s Ty Cobb was the highest paid player in the league at $20,000, while Tris Speaker was second at $16,000. The entire White Sox payroll topped just $85,000. Joe Jackson, with one of the best swings in the game, was getting paid just $6,000, and his teammate and participator in the eventual fix, Eddie Cicotte, received only $5,000. Cicotte won 28 games the year before and deserved twice what he was paid.⁶ He was offered a $10,000 bonus for winning thirty games in 1917, but after he won his 29th game, he was benched on the pretense that he needed rest for the World Series. As a result of Comiskey’s contractual corner cutting, Cicotte became an integral contributor to the eventual fix.

In the off season, owners throughout the league agreed to lower salaries for fear that attendance would not rebound after World War I. This quickly proved unnecessary as attendance was soaring especially in Chicago. Comiskey stayed the most loyal to keeping salaries down even though he was making the most money at the turnstiles. Knowing this, the players threatened to strike in July 1919 unless their salaries were
readjusted to that of the rest of the league. Using his relationship with the players, 
manager Gleason was able to temporarily cool the situation down. Comiskey’s niggardly 
treatment of his players became a major factor in why the fix would ever be formulated 
and how it was able to be carried out.

Another contributing factor to the fix was that the pitching had suffered injuries 
late in the season. As a result, the team would be using only three starting pitchers in the 
playoffs. This made such a fix easy because the conspirators only needed to involve the 
first two pitchers and a few of the regular hitters. Eventually, it was revealed that the fix 
actually involved eight players (though two of them did nothing for the fix other than 
simply having their names associated).

Arnold “Chick” Gandil planned the idea for the fix during the season because of 
his discontent over the lack of financial rewards. Not only did he intend to receive the 
money he felt was owed to him, but he also wanted to cause Comiskey the financial 
damage he felt had been done to him. He met with his associate, Joseph “Sport” Sullivan, 
on the night of September 10, 1919, in his hotel room. Sullivan was a financially savvy 
gambler who seemed to be able to get rich off anyone. He was the associate of Arnold 
Rothstein. Gandil proposed the idea of fixing the World Series by involving enough 
players to do so, but few enough to keep it secretive. In return for the fix, Gandil 
demanded $80,000. Sullivan coolly considered the offer, but was somewhat worried 
about the magnitude of the scheme. He left the hotel without giving an answer.

Another group of gamblers was led by Abe Attell and included Sleepy Bill Burns 
and Billy Maharg. Though this group was separate, Abe Attell still worked with 
Rothstein. Burns convinced Attell to ask Rothstein for the $100,000 that the players 
demanded in return for throwing the series. Rothstein refused at first, but later joined the 
cause and took over the operation. Though many more gamblers gained knowledge of the 
fix, they were only marginally involved. Between the two major gambling groups, it was 
eventually agreed the players would be paid $80,000 for the fix, but only $10,000 was 
paid up front.

Even before the meeting with the gamblers, Gandil had been recruiting for the 
fix. His first target was the much underpaid and subsequently upset Eddie Cicotte. 
Cicotte was first introduced to the idea in July after the players threatened to strike. 
Although he was interested, he refused to do so. It took weeks of Gandil’s nagging him 
with the money to persuade him. He agreed to the fix if he was paid $10,000 before the 
series began. The next players to get involved would be shortstop “Swede” Risberg and 
utility infielder Fred McMullin, (the latter only because he overheard Gandil proposing 
the idea to the former).

To make the fix possible, Gandil needed another pitcher who would pitch two or 
three games in the series. He found this pitcher in Claude “Lefty” Williams, who was 
also skeptical of the plan but eventually convinced by Gandil’s continuous offers of 
money. Though the fix may have been able to go on with only the two pitchers, Risberg, 
and Williams, gamblers demanded more names for security purposes. Thus, Gandil spoke 
with “Buck” Weaver, ‘Shoeless” Joe Jackson, and Oscar “Happy” Felsch (the third, 
fourth, and fifth hitters on the team). Joe Jackson was the only one to refuse the idea 
when he was approached by Gandil and offered $10,000. The other two agreed and the 
seven involved players met at Gandil’s hotel room on the night of September 21st. At this 
first meeting, the player lightheartedly joked about the series as they formulated their
Despite Jackson’s refusal to be involved in the fix, Gandil used his name with the gamblers anyway. Upon his second meeting, Gandil, offering $20,000, told Jackson “You might as well say yes, or play ball or do anything you want,” i.e., the fix would go on with or without him. After this conversation, Gandil left Jackson alone, and chose to use Joe’s name regardless of his answer.

With rumors flying and gamblers from around the country knowing about the fix, money was pouring in on the Reds and Jackson began to worry about the fix being kept from the spotlight. The night before the series, he decided to visit Comiskey and tell him the story about the fix: “I went to Mr. Comiskey and begged him to take me out of the lineup... If there was something going on I knew the bench would be the safest place, but he wouldn’t listen to me.” He told Comiskey to state that Jackson was suspended for drinking or some other behavioral issue. However, Comiskey refused, saying Jackson was too good of a player to lose. He calmed Jackson down by pointing to the fact that such rumors flew around every year. (It must be noted that Jackson likely had little to offer Comiskey by way of details regarding the fix because he had not been present for any meetings nor heard any details of the scheme).

Since he knew he could come under scrutiny by Comiskey or others if the fix ever leaked, Jackson played with more intensity and less fun than he ever did before. This resulted in setting the World Series record of 12 hits in route to a .365 batting average with six runs batted in and five runs scored. His resulting tremendous performance in the Series is blamed once again by those opposing Jackson on his assumed stupidity. They say he could not control his natural ability, that it was simply instinct. An additional argument, parallel to the former, was the idea that Joe could get a hit when he chose and chose only to hit when it would not help the team. Though this is proven false when the timing of the hits is considered, Jackson got several key hits which led to wins. Many people point out that these hits occurred after the team was playing to win. This may be true, but it was difficult to get RBI’s when the hitters in the lineup ahead of him were not playing to win. Similarly, it was difficult to score runs when hitters behind him were not playing to win.

The series began in Cincinnati on a hot October 1st. To show that the fix was on, Cicotte hit the first batter he faced, Morrie Rath, with the second pitch. He would give up a run after Rath scored on Jake Daubert’s single coupled with Heinie Groh’s sacrifice fly to Jackson. Joe Jackson scored to tie it for the White Sox on Gandil’s single. Gandil was thrown out stretching it into a double. The fourth inning proved more fateful as Cicotte gave up five runs. Questionable plays in the inning included a failed attempt at a double play by Risberg and a ball he was unable to get to behind his head. The game ended 9-1 with Jackson, Felsch and Gandil making the final three outs of the game. After the surprise game one loss, Gleason, Schalk, and other uninvolved players were fuming at the performance of the team.

Gleason continued to hear rumors of the fix and received many telegrams from angry fans expressing their concern. He showed them to Comiskey and explained his concern. With the National League president John A. Heydler, Comiskey approached American League President Ban Johnson with the news and telegrams. Though once friends, Comiskey and Johnson were no longer on speaking terms. The grudge was reflected in Johnson’s thoughtless response, “What Comiskey says is like the crying of a
whipped cur."12 As a result, Comiskey went to bed without answers. Comiskey would later use this to put the blame on Johnson. "I blame Ban Johnson for allowing this series to continue. If ever a League President blundered in a crisis, Ban did."13

Since Johnson did nothing the series continued. Lefty Williams started the second game determined to blow the game without looking as bad as Cicotte had. He started off by getting to the bottom of the fourth inning scoreless. However, in the fourth, the usually well controlled Williams seemed to lose control of his pitches and of the game. With the rabid fans screaming and Schalk and Gleason visibly upset at Williams, he was unable to gain control until the Reds scored three runs on three walks and two hits in the inning. This was very uncharacteristic of Williams who usually thrived on pinpoint control and the ability to put the ball where he wanted. The White Sox went on to lose the game 4-2 even though they out hit the Reds ten to four. Williams had succeeded - looking brilliant while doing it, but nevertheless losing a close game. Joe Jackson had three hits in the game, helping the White Sox score their two runs.14

Although the gambler Abe Attel had made thousands, he coughed up only $10,000 to be split up amongst the players. The players had blown two games for the gamblers and received only a fourth of the money promised to them by this point. They were upset and Gandil told the gamblers that the players had met and decided to continue the series as it had gone. In reality, no such meeting between the players had taken place. No one knew what was going to happen considering the starting pitcher was not involved in the fix. For game three, Gleason sent the rookie, Little Dickie Kerr, to the mound. He was a good rookie pitcher, but no one expected him to pitch a shutout in the Sox 3-0 victory. Gandil knocked Jackson in from third for the first run of the game, the only run that would be needed. The loss upset the gamblers and dealt a devastating blow to some of them.

Sleepy Bill Burns had bet his fortunes on the game and lost it all. In a meeting after the game, Gandil demanded the money, but Burns refused to pay before the next game because of what had happened to him in game three. The meeting ended with Burns believing the fix was off. However, the next day, Sullivan was able to convince Gandil to go on with the fix by promising $20,000 immediately and another $20,000 before game five even though he had no intention of following through with the second payment.15 Despite the lack of trust between the team and the gamblers, the fix was back on when Cicotte took the mound in Chicago for game four.

Cicotte handled the Reds through the first four innings, putting them down scoreless. In the fifth inning, Duncan hit a ball back to Cicotte who rushed the play and threw wildly to first, allowing Duncan to reach second. The following play was even more suspicious. Kopf lined a single to Jackson in left field. Jackson made a perfect throw, but the ball was for some reason deflected by Cicotte as he tried to cut it off. The ball rolled behind home plate and Duncan scored. The two mishaps by Cicotte were all that was needed as the game ended 2-0. The excitement from the rookie Dickie Kerr's performance had all but evaporated for the Chicago fans and Gleason.

The fifth game was a rain out, giving Gleason the option of skipping Williams in the rotation in favor of the rookie, but he opted not to and instead, put his trust in Williams. Williams took to the mound knowing that he was on a short leash with Gleason suspecting. He pitched four hitless innings to start the game, but in the sixth Eller lead off with a triple, poorly played by the Sox defense. A single and sacrifice put a man on
second with a run in. Roush lofted a fly ball into center field where Felsch misplayed the ball and then dropped it while attempting to handle it. When the ball finally made it home, Schalk dove at the sliding runner just missing him. The three runs were enough for the Reds to easily win with Hod Eller pitching like Cy Young.16

The following day in Cincinnati, Sullivan failed to show up with the promised cash. Thus, Gandil and the rest of the involved players decided the fix was off. They would try to win the series and lose the gamblers’ big money. The sixth game of the series began with errors abound for the now competitively playing White Sox. Quickly they were down 4-0 and it seemed to be another repeat performance. But in the sixth inning, the offense finally exploded, scoring three runs to tie the score. Gandil knocked in the game winning run in the ninth inning and Dickie Kerr finished the game for the win.

The day after the win the club house’s mood lightened. Gleason trusted Cicotte to win the all important seventh game. Cicotte delivered as he completed the game in less than 100 minutes winning 4-1. The game was highlighted by poor defensive play by the Reds. The uninspired Reds’ crowd of only 13,923 fans did not help the mood or performance of the team.17

The two past wins were not part of the plan and angered the gamblers. Rothstein became very unnerved at the thought of the series going to nine games. He’d known from the start that there were too many people involved with the fix and now his worst fears were coming true. Rothstein calmly met with Sullivan, making him aware of his fears and warning Sullivan that the series had better not go nine games. Sullivan needed to communicate this to the starter Lefty Williams immediately. Though it was not his style, Sullivan was forced to threaten Williams and his family to be sure the game would be lost. He knew a man Harry F. from Chicago, “who was skilled in the finer arts of persuasion.”18 Though he demanded $500, Harry promised that Williams would receive the message.

Before the game, Kid Gleason lectured his team, “The minute I think anyone of you ain’t playing ball to win—if I think you’re laying down—I’m gonna pull you out even if I have to make an infielder out of a bullpen catcher! I’m gonna tell you this, too: I would use an iron on any sonovabitch who would sell out this ball club!”19 Unfortunately for Gleason, Williams had already been threatened by Harry F., a threat taken much more seriously. With him and his wife’s lives on the line, Williams would not last even one inning. After getting the leadoff hitter out, Williams allowed four straight hits and three runs in just fifteen pitches. Bill James relieved him and with the help of the rest of the bullpen proceeded to give up seven more runs. The White Sox went quietly until the eighth inning when they rallied to score four runs. It was too late and the game would end 10-5, bringing the series to a close.

That night in Jackson’s hotel room, he was offered $5,000 in an envelope by a drunken Lefty Williams. Williams explained to him that they had told the gamblers that Jackson would play to lose. Williams felt Jackson had been betrayed and thought Jackson should receive a share. Jackson was upset his name had been used without his knowledge. Jackson argued with Williams and informed him that he would tell Comiskey the following day.20 Williams threw the envelope to the ground and Jackson was forced to accept it, but he intended to give it to Comiskey.

With the series over, the cover up by Comiskey and other members of baseball’s leadership began. The day after the series, Joe Jackson went back to Comiskey, this time
with proof and more details of the fix than before (e.g., the envelope containing $5,000). However, Comiskey's secretary sent Jackson home and told him that Comiskey would write to him if anything further arose, but Jackson never heard back from him. Comiskey was already being informed of the fix by Chick Gandil and Happy Felsch.21 Gambler, Harry Redmon, who had lost money on the series, was willing to provide information if he would be compensated. Comiskey made it worth his while to hear the details from a gambler even though he was not directly involved in the fix.22

Although he had all the knowledge he needed, Comiskey offered a $20,000 reward to anyone willing to provide concrete information about the fix. As far as anyone else knew, he had no further knowledge beyond the well circulated rumors. This made him appear eager to find the truth, without being forced to turn in his team and lose all the value the players offered. Comiskey hired a private detective to investigate the suspected players as well as other teams that may have corrupt players. He could use this knowledge against any other team that attempted to accuse the White Sox or himself.23

The player's award for being on the losing team of the World Series was supposed to be $3,000. Comiskey held this check from the eight players who had their names involved. When Jackson did not receive his check, he sent Comiskey a letter, informing him of the missing check and requesting it be sent to him. Comiskey's response questioned the integrity of Jackson's play during the series and offered to pay expenses for a trip back to Chicago to clear his name. Jackson responded by citing his performance as proof that he was not involved and thus, he accepted Comiskey's offer. Yet, Jackson did not hear from Comiskey after that because Comiskey did not want to hear Jackson's testimony. Instead, Comiskey sent Henry Grabiner to Jackson to negotiate a new contract for the following year.

Grabiner convinced Jackson to sign a contract without having his wife Katie read it. Grabiner threatened him with their knowledge of the fix and pressured him into signing it even though it was only $8,000 and Joe wanted $10,000. Jackson had demanded that the Ten Day Clause, which allowed a team to hold pay of a player after ten days of being injured, be left out of the contract. Mysteriously, when Grabiner read the contract to Jackson the clause did not exist, but after it was signed the clause appeared. Jackson was taken advantage of yet again.24

At the end of the 1920 season, the 1919 Series fix reemerged in national news. The rapidly spreading knowledge of the fix led gambler Billy Maharg to tell the story of the fix to Comiskey in hopes for the now only $10,000 reward. The reward was never received and he incriminated himself and the other gamblers, including Rothstein, Bill Burns, and Abe Attell.

Now that it was inevitable that the fix would be brought to public knowledge, Comiskey made his move. Before the grand jury indictment, and "for the good of the public as he claimed," Comiskey suspended all eight players whose names were mentioned in the fix, "even though it costs Chicago the pennant."25 He began to work with his lawyer Alfred Austrian, to incriminate his players and make him appear as the owner who gave up his team for the integrity of the game. Comiskey relied on Austrian to find the players who would admit first in the grand jury investigation. The first player to be encouraged to confess to the jury was a frightened Eddie Cicotee. He was advised to confess and show his sorrow for hurting Comiskey because the jury would appreciate it more. Cicotee assumed that since he was a White sox player and Austrian was the
White Sox lawyer, Austrian was his lawyer. This was a false assumption. Austrian was Comiskey’s lawyer and was not looking out for the interest of Cicotee.

While confessing, Cicotee mentioned Joe Jackson as being involved in the fix. Upon hearing this, Jackson went straight to Comiskey to get help in clearing his name. Unfortunately, he fell right into the trap. When he went to see Comiskey, the only person to be found was Austrian. Austrian used his position as “The White Sox lawyer” to convince Jackson not to tell the true story which would prove Comiskey knew about the fix during the Series. Austrian gave the same advice he gave to Cicotee, i.e., to explain that he was involved and act sympathetic. Austrian told Jackson the truth would appear weak since his name had already been linked by the gambler Maharg and Cicotee. So under the advice of “his” lawyer Jackson admitted his guilt in the fix.

A very confused Jackson told both stories of the fix to the court. When questioned by the grand jury he denied being involved in the ring or doing anything to throw any game of the series, but when asked by the District Attorney in front of the Grand Jury,

Q: How much did he say he would pay you?
A: Twenty thousand dollars, if I would take part.
Q: And you said you would?
A: Yes, sir.

He repeatedly added statements to the end of his answers such as, “I tried to win all the time” or “I was ashamed of myself.” These conflicting statements confused what Austrian had told him to do with his own story because he also wanted to clear his name.26

When Jackson was leaving the court room, the myth of “Say it ain’t so, Joe” was originated. The story claims that a child asked Jackson this question and that he responded by confirming it was true. However, this story was later denied by Jackson who claimed no one talked to him except the officers leading him out. Despite this, the question became immortalized – an intricate part of the “Shoeless” Joe Jackson legend.27

The eight members involved in the fix were indicted by the grand jury at the end of September. Less than two months later, Judge Kenisaw Mountain Landis was named the first commissioner of the Major Leagues. Once in office, he threatened all eight involved players: There is absolutely no chance for any of them to creep back into organized baseball. They will be and remain outlaws... it is sure that the guilt of some of them at least will be proved.”28 The day after the grand jury found them not guilty, Landis permanently put the eight players on the ineligible list.

Between September and February, when the players were supposed to go back on trial, the courts got mixed up. There was a new district attorney and some of the attorneys from the prosecution side now were on the defense side, making for a confusing situation. As a result, the new District Attorney determined that the original indictments were faulty. With the old indictments, testimony, and immunity waivers thrown out, the new trial began in June 1921. The trial did not include Fred McMullin who was acquitted for lack of evidence, but the other seven newly indicted players and ten gamblers stood against the court.

The players now had their own lawyers looking out for their interest. This resulted in Jackson telling a story contrary to what he had said the previous time in court. He told
the true story, proving his innocence and condemning Comiskey’s knowledge of the fix. The gamblers story corroborated with Joe’s innocence. Their stories confirmed Gandil’s initiation of the fix with no mention of Jackson being involved. Despite this, the judge asked for five year jail sentences and $2,000 fines for all involved, but the jury found them innocent of all charges. Despite this ruling, Landis made use of his unquestioned power by banning all seven players from baseball.\(^{29}\)

Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player that throws a ball game; no player that undertakes or promises to throw a ball game; no player that sits in a conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where the ways and the means of throwing games are planned and discussed and does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professional baseball.\(^{30}\)

However it must be noted that this statement when applied to the case of Joe Jackson does not result in grounds for expulsion. Jackson does not meet any of the criteria set out by Landis for expulsion from baseball. Jackson never threw a game, promised to throw a game, nor sat in a conference with the others involved in the fix. Once he learned of the fix, he immediately went to Comiskey to inform him. Unfortunately, his lack of knowledge of the fix and Comiskey’s corruption lead Comiskey to simply ignore the information.

Jackson was a necessary victim for Comiskey’s cover up. Under false presumptions, Comiskey’s lawyer, Austrian, convinced Jackson to admit guilt to the court. This admission and the $5,000 which Comiskey refused to meet with Jackson about became the two integral pieces of evidence used to prove Jackson’s guilt. Upon close review, the evidence of Jackson’s involvement in the fix of the 1919 World Series can be linked back to Comiskey. Jackson has remained a scapegoat for the situation by the leaders of baseball to keep the Hall of Famers, Charles Comiskey and Ban Johnson image clean. Used by the involved players and by Comiskey in his plan to cover up the fix, Jackson never gave up on baseball. He remained in love with the game and played in mill towns and on barnstorming teams until he was forty five. Although he always wanted to have his name cleared, he was not bitter about the situation and led a successful life after baseball, owning a liquor store and making more money than he would have in baseball.

Since his death in 1951, Joe’s story has been continuously studied by scholars and fans alike. Each time it is, new intricacies and details are revealed that prove Jackson’s innocence at the expense of Charles Comiskey. Comiskey began the confusion of Jackson’s tale over eighty years ago, but Jackson’s story has been converted to a legendary one due to the different stories resulting from the complexity of his story. With each new story in the media such as the 1989 film “Field of Dreams” “Shoeless” Joe Jackson’s legend grows. This fictional story coupled with the false myths previously discussed, enhance the legend that Comiskey created to protect himself, over eighty years ago.

\(^1\) Jackson’s year of birth is often disputed, read on his tombstone to be 1888, but on his death certificate as 1889. Some use the year 1887 as well. Birth certificates were not required at that time in the small town he was born
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2 David Fleitz, Shoeless The life and times of Joe Jackson, (Mcfarland and Company, 2001) p. 12
3 "This is the Truth", Joe Jackson, http://www.blackbetsy.com/jjtruth.htm
4 Harvey Frommer, Shoeless Joe and Ragtime Baseball, (Taylor Publishing, 1994)
5 Ibid p. 86
6 David Fleitz, Shoeless The life and times of Joe Jackson, (Mcfarland and Company, 2001) p. 161
7 Elliot Asinof, Eight Men Out, (Holt, 1987)
8 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain't So Joe, (Lynx Books, 1988) p.164
10 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain't So Joe, (Lynx Books, 1988) p.167
11 The record 12 hits though impressive is misleading since it was in eight games of the nine game series.
   There were only three other nine game series 1903, 1920, and 1921.
14 Ibid p. 106
16 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain't So Joe, (Lynx Books, 1988) p.150
17 Elliot Asinof, Eight Men Out, (Holt, 1987) p.110 and 111 The incredibly small crowd was blamed on
   rumors that Herrmann, the Reds owner had fixed the series to go extra long to make more money. This
   combined with horrible traffic the day before left people home instead of in the seats.
18 Ibid p. 113
19 Ibid p.115 Kid Gleason
22 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain't So Joe, (Lynx Books, 1988) p.172
23 Ibid p.174
24 Ibid p.178
25 Ibid p.182 Comiskey's note to the eight suspended players closed with this.
26 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain't So Joe, (Lynx Books, 1988) p.184-188
27 Ibid p.190
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II
Analyzing the Impact of Three Histories of World War II: Books by Bullock, Shirer, and Churchill
By Kevin Prendergast '10

"The Second World War was an altogether different conflict, but the will to win was every bit as important—indeed it was more so. The contest was popularly perceived to be about issues of life and death for whole communities rather than for their fighting forces alone. They were issues, wrote one American observer in 1939, 'worth dying for'...Half a century later the level of cruelty, destruction and sacrifice that it engendered is hard to comprehend, let alone recapture. Fifty years of security and prosperity have opened up a gulf between our own age and the age of the crisis and violence that propelled the world into war."¹

I. The Second World War: An Introduction

It was a war that brought some twenty-five countries into full-scale armed conflict. It was a war that cost some sixty million lives in all, both military and civilian. No other war in world history has ever claimed as many human lives, cost as much, in terms of the amount of monetary destruction of infrastructure, or incited as much hatred and utter brutality as this war. There were countless battles and skirmishes taking place simultaneously all across the globe. World War II was also marked by genocide on a massive scale in a number of places, such as in the city of Nanking in China, or throughout Europe in German death camps.

For all of these reasons alike, it is important that people know what happened at these places and others in the bloodiest war known to mankind. There have been thousands of books published recounting the events of the Second World War. Some have been published by professional historians, documenting the major figures who helped shape the course of the war. One such example of this type is *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* by the renowned British historian Alan Bullock. Some books that have been written about the war are memoirs, written by those who lived through various parts of the war. An example of this type is *Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941* by William Shirer, who was an American CBS news correspondent who lived in Berlin, Germany during the rise of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime. One final type of book about the Second World War is a book written by a major

figure from the World War II-era on the entire war. In this case, an example would be Winston Churchill's massive, six-volume history of the Second World War, bearing the same name. However, for the purposes of this paper, the book in particular that will be analyzed is the first of the six volumes, The Gathering Storm. While Churchill was not an academic or a professional historian, he devoted many years to creating a complete history of the war. Although he attempts to write the history as a detached historian, it still cannot be denied that he is writing about events which he helped shape. Nonetheless, the enormous six-volume history remains one of the most important works about the entire Second World War.

II. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny

When it was first published in 1952, Alan Bullock's biography of Hitler was one of the first epic biographies published of the man who headed Nazi Germany. Much of the information that helped Bullock write the book came out of the many different testimonies of the 1945-1946 Nuremberg Trials, in which major German leaders were tried as war criminals. Many of the German leaders placed much of the blame on Adolf Hitler for the atrocities that occurred under the regime. In the Preface to the Abridged Edition of his book, Bullock writes, the major question, "suggested by much that was said at the Nuremberg Trials, was to discover how great a part Hitler played in the history of the Third Reich and whether Göring and the other defendants were exaggerating when they claimed that under the Nazi regime the will of one man, and of one man alone, was decisive." It baffled Bullock how one man, especially one of such modest roots as Adolf Hitler, could rise to power and become so influential, so controlling of so many aspects of German life. For this reason, Bullock identifies his goal as "to offer an account of one of the most puzzling and remarkable careers in modern history."

As it did for so many others, Hitler's rise to power in Germany greatly intrigued Alan Bullock. To him, the most pressing question was: how could this happen? How could one man come to become so revered that he could influence so many people to do such disastrous, horrific and, in other cases, utterly absurd things? Bullock identifies that historians have come to understand Hitler in many different ways. Some view Hitler as a brilliant orator, capable of so greatly captivating his listeners that they would do anything for him. Others view Hitler as a mere pawn to German capitalist interest. Even more have come to contend that Hitler was merely a symbol of the restless ambitions of Germany to one day dominate Europe. However, Bullock counters that all of these analyses are merely overly-simplified views of Hitler or of the German nation.

Bullock understands that Hitler's rise occurred in the midst of a sweeping revolutionary time in Germany. It seems that it was almost a certainty that some politician at that time would feed off of the injustices of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles in an attempt to attain more power. For this reason, Bullock asserts that "Obviously, Nazism was a complex phenomenon to which many factors - social, economic, historical, psychological - contributed... It may be true that a mass movement, strongly nationalistic, anti-Semitic, and radical, would have sprung up in Germany without

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3 Bullock, Hitler, vii.
4 Bullock, Hitler, 485.
Hitler.” Thus, Bullock concedes that the time was ripe for Hitler to take power in Germany, because of the restlessness of the masses. People were so outraged at the failures of German leadership during the First World War. The economic hardships of the Great Depression and the hyperinflation which preceded it made daily life in Germany extremely miserable. Yet, as Bullock clearly identifies, “Hitler neither understood nor was interested in economics, but he was alive to the social and political consequences of events which affected the life of every family in Germany.”5 Thus, although Hitler had no real understanding of the science of economics and, quite frankly, no real interest in it, he understood how to capitalize on the plight of those who suffered during the Great Depression. This ability to understand the wants of the people around him allowed Hitler to use that knowledge to gain immense support from the disenfranchised.

Throughout the book, Bullock makes it clear that Adolf Hitler’s rise to power was the product of opportunism. He was incredibly skilled at preying on the wants and needs of the lower class people in Germany. As Bullock writes, “Hitler was the greatest demagogue in history. Those who add ‘only a demagogue’ fail to appreciate the nature of political power in an age of mass politics. As he himself said: ‘To be a leader, means to be able to move masses.’”6 Hitler was an excellent orator who was able to rouse a crowd like few others could ever do. The Nazi party in Germany was one that began in bars and warehouses, but was able to gain incredible support through the work of Hitler and others, such as Joseph Goebbels, who led the propaganda machine of the Nazi party. It was Hitler’s ability to spark the passions of thousands of crowds throughout his political career that turned the Nazi party into the controlling force that it was throughout World War II. Yet, as Bullock states, “The Nazi campaign could not have succeeded as it did by the ingenuity of its methods alone, if it had not at the same time corresponded and appealed to the mood of a considerable proportion of the German people.”7

Hitler was a master of building power by preying on the wants and needs of the working class. His masterful oratory skills made him into a major force in German politics even when many of the members of the German government did not like him. However, once the Nazi party headed the German government, it was their tactics of power politics that allowed them to suppress all opposition as well as they did. Hitler conveyed these right-wing totalitarian ideas ever since he was a young man living in Vienna. For instance, as Bullock writes, “Hitler reached the conclusion that: ‘the psyche of the broad masses is accessible only to what is strong and uncompromising...The masses of the people prefer the ruler to the suppliant and are filled with a stronger sense of mental security by a teaching that brooks no rival than by a teaching which offers them a liberal choice.’”8 In this way, it seems quite evident that Hitler always had an inclination to the sort of totalitarian policies which he employed while he was in power. He saw no benefit in providing the masses with free speech or varying ideas on an issue. Rather, he thought that society actually benefitted from being told what to think by a strong leader. Further, as Bullock writes, “Hitler had no use for any democratic

5 Bullock, Hitler, 77.
6 Bullock, Hitler, 37.
7 Bullock, Hitler, 115.
8 Bullock, Hitler, 18.
institution: free speech, free press, or parliament.” For, in Hitler’s own words, “The majority represents not only ignorance but cowardice...The majority can never replace the man.”

This is the essence of what Bullock contends made Hitler into the incredibly powerful figure which he became. While he was an up-and-coming younger politician in Germany, he preyed on the restless sentiments of the masses, who were feeling wronged by the Treaty of Versailles and by the German government’s ineffective economic policies. He used his excellent oratory skills and persuasiveness, combined with Goebbels’ extremely effective propaganda, to build a major movement in the German political landscape. He used the system to attain power, then changed the system to fit his wants once he had power. As Bullock writes, in doing the things he did, “Hitler never abandoned the cloak of legality; instead he turned the law inside out and made illegality legal.” Thus, while it is possible that another leader could have achieved power in a similar way in Germany, it is doubtful that few could have achieved the devastating results that Adolf Hitler did.

III. Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941

William L. Shirer’s Berlin Diary provides a very important American perspective to Hitler’s rise to power from someone who lived in Berlin during the time period. It is interesting, however, that this book is not the one that made Shirer most famous. Despite its importance because of the fact that Shirer was writing a firsthand account of Hitler’s rise to power, Shirer’s book entitled The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich is actually the book for which most people know Shirer. Berlin Diary is also particularly relevant because, while many of Shirer’s writings come from his time in Berlin, there are certain periods in which Shirer travels to other major cities throughout Europe, such as London, Vienna, Warsaw, and others. Thus, he is able to provide another interesting perspective on Hitler’s rise in Germany.

It is also worth noting that the book, Berlin Diary, was published around the time that the United States entered the war in 1941. Thus, its importance as a way for many living at the time to understand what happened to get the world tossed into such a war is something that should be remembered as well. The reason why Shirer decided to leave is because the German government placed increasing pressure on Shirer to report the official Nazi state-issued news reports and not his own personal ideas and opinions on what was happening in Germany. For this reason, Shirer became more and more concerned about not only his ability to report the accurate news, but for his own personal safety as well. For this reason, the diary comes to an end on December 13, 1940, with Shirer writing aboard a ship bound for the United States. He reflects on his time in Europe by writing, “I had spent all fifteen of my adult years [in Europe]...they had been happy years, personally, and for all people in Europe they had had meaning and borne hope until the war came and the Nazi blight and the hatred and the fraud and the political gangsterism and the murder and the massacre and the incredible intolerance and all the

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9 Bullock, Hitler, 16.
10 Bullock, Hitler, 16.
11 Bullock, Hitler, 141.
suffering...". This passage is a good representative of many of the incredibly cruel things that Shirer witnessed over the course of his seven years in Berlin during the Nazi rise.

Shirer was also able to shed light on many other aspects of Nazi life during his seven years stationed in Berlin. For instance, he writes at length on how he perceived Adolf Hitler and his rise in Germany. On September 5, 1934, very early in the diary, he writes, "every word dropped by Hitler seemed like an inspired Word from on high. Man’s – or at least the German’s – critical faculty is swept away at such moments, and every lie pronounced is accepted as high truth itself." This account seems to convey the same ideas as presented by Alan Bullock regarding Hitler’s incredible power of oratory and his ability to arouse a crowd in unity with the utmost ease. Also similar to the ideas presented by Bullock is the idea that these seemingly fanatical ideas were not Hitler’s alone. Rather, as Shirer writes, "It must also be noted down that Hitler’s frenzy for bloody conquest is by no means exclusive to him in Germany." Shirer was absolutely appalled at some of the outlandish comments made by people in Germany at this time. He could not believe some of the things people were believing. For instance, "As to the proclamation, it contained such statements as these, all wildly applauded as if they were new truths: ‘The German form of life is definitely determined for the next thousand years...There will be no revolution in Germany for the next one thousand years!’"

Shirer also reported on the interactions between Hitler and other world leaders and was even able to see Hitler making speeches in front of the Reichstag early on in his time in Germany. One report, made in the days before the Munich Pact was agreed upon in 1938, states that "Hitler has demanded that Czechoslovakia not later than Saturday, October 1, agree to the handing over of Sudetenland to Germany...[yet] the German people I talked with in the streets of Cologne this morning, and in Berlin this evening, believe there’ll be peace." Two days later, Shirer witnessed a speech made by Hitler in front of some fifteen thousand Nazi party members regarding the impending crisis. Shirer recorded, "Curious audience, the fifteen thousand party Bonzen packed the hall. They applauded his words with usual enthusiasm...Twice Hitler screamed that this is absolutely his last territorial demand in Europe." It is simply incredible to read some of these vivid firsthand accounts of some of the most important events of the Second World War. It is for this reason, among others, that Shirer’s work still remains an important piece of the history of the war.

Not only did Shirer attend many major Nazi party gatherings as a reporter, but he was able to attain other information from Germans during this time as well. Naturally, because Shirer’s book was published during the war, many of his informants are not mentioned by name. On September 21, 1940, a man to whom Shirer refers as X, told Shirer a "weird story": "The German form of life is definitely determined for the next thousand years...There will be no revolution in Germany for the next one thousand years!""12 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 605.
13 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 585.
14 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 512.
now systematically bumping off the mentally deficient people of the Reich. The Nazis call them ‘mercy deaths.’”19 A few months later, on November 25, 1940, Shirer adds more details to the gruesome story, writing, “I have at last got to the bottom of these ‘mercy killings.’ It’s an evil tale. The Gestapo, with the knowledge and approval of the German government, is systematically putting to death the mentally deficient population of the Reich... A conservative and trustworthy German tells me he estimates the number at a hundred thousand. I think that figure is too high.”20 Thus, it is evident that, although Shirer lived in Berlin for nearly seven years and witnessed so many eye-opening things in Nazi Germany, he still could not fathom the atrocities that had occurred and would continue to occur under Adolf Hitler.

IV. The Gathering Storm

Winston Churchill’s The Second World War still remains one of the most definitive histories on the war. It was written in six volumes, published over six years, and contains thousands of pages of information about the war. The masterpiece even helped earn Winston Churchill the 1953 Nobel Prize in Literature. In the Presentation Speech made when Churchill accepted his award, the presenting member of the Swedish Academy stated, “Very seldom have great statesmen and warriors also been great writers... Churchill’s political and literary achievements are of such magnitude that one is tempted to resort to portray him as a Caesar who also has the gift of Cicero’s pen... With all due respects to archives and documents, there is something special about history written by a man who has himself helped to make it.”21

Much of Churchill’s first volume, The Gathering Storm, which regards the period from 1919 through May 10, 1940, is dedicated to portraying how the Second World War was very much a war that could have easily been stopped. For instance, he explicitly writes in the preface to The Gathering Storm, “One day President Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what the war should be called. I said at once ‘The Unnecessary War.’ There never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle.”22 Churchill contends that if European leaders had not been so quick to appease Hitler on numerous occasions that the problem could have been resolved in a much easier way than it was. If Europe had cared to notice Hitler’s rise to power, it would have been a much easier problem to solve. However, as he writes, “The ceaseless struggles and gradual emergence of Adolf Hitler as a national figure were little noticed by the victors.”23 Churchill is also quite critical of the victors of the First World War for their harsh treatment of Germany at the Versailles Conference, calling the treaty and subsequent actions taken toward Germany “The Follies of the Victors.”24

There were numerous other occasions on which Hitler could have easily been stopped. Regarding the German breach of the Versailles Treaty through armed build-up, Churchill wrote, “The United States had washed their hands of all concern with Europe,
apart from wishing well to everybody, and were sure they would never have to be bothered with it again. But France, Great Britain, and also — decidedly — Italy... felt bound to challenge this definite act of treaty-violation by Hitler."25 Thus, he sees it as a mistake by the United States to turn to isolationist policies after the First World War. Also, as he notes, much of Europe was too bogged down in its own affairs to worry about German problems. However, he conveys the cause of his own country as well as Italy and France as a noble one, in which few cared to join.

One other instance of which Churchill writes at length is the debate over the Sudetenland and the subsequent Munich Conference, which he deems "The Tragedy of Munich."26 Churchill finds this to be very much a turning point in the growing conflict with Germany. After the appeasement of Hitler, Churchill recognizes that a number of major European nations began to deem it necessary to build up their military, as the concern over another war began to mount. As Churchill writes, "After the sense of relief springing from the Munich agreement had worn off Mr. Chamberlain and his government found themselves confronted by a sharp dilemma. The Prime Minister had said, 'I believe it is peace for our time.' But the majority of his colleagues wished to utilise 'our time' to rearm as rapidly as possible."27 Thus, it is evident that, although many hoped the Munich Pact would bring peace, many European leaders were not entirely blind to the growing political and military aspirations of Adolf Hitler and the rest of Nazi Germany. However, this major mistake had been made and, just as many armies began to grow throughout Europe, Hitler’s did as well. And, the rest of the story, which comes to fill thousands more pages in Churchill’s six volume work, as they say, is history.

V. Conclusion

All of these three books differ in their style. All of these three books are written by different people with different perspectives — one a professional historian, one a news correspondent, and another a major player in the events of the war. Yet, all three of these works are immensely valuable and remain to be so. They all serve to make future generations aware of the seemingly unfathomable events that took place from 1933-1945. As Churchill writes in the preface to The Gathering Storm, "It is my earnest hope that pondering upon the past may give guidance in days to come, enable a new generation to repair some of the errors of former years, and thus govern, in accordance with the needs and glory of man, the awful unfolding scene of the future."28 This is how these three books, very different in both their perspective and content, all serve a very similar purpose — to educate those who were not able, thankfully, to witness some of the unspeakable atrocities of this horrific war. Thus, hopefully, by learning about the past through works such as these three, one would hope that future generations can use the lessons learned out of this war to create a much better future for both themselves and their children.

Bibliography


Dean Gooderham Acheson was the fifty-first United States Secretary of State appointed to this Cabinet position by President Harry S. Truman. The confirmation of his position occurred in January 1949 and he served through January of 1953. Acheson was instrumental in developing and implementing United States' foreign policy which had positive, profound, and long-lasting effect. The point to be examined here is the evolution of his policy from benign coexistence to aggressive containment. This thesis will be examined during that period of his career from 1947 (as Under Secretary) through 1950, specifically, his role in the development and application of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, its military corollary the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and NSC-68. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program will also be included because although not Achesonian in origin, he did see it to its conclusion.

However, as is the case with any story, some background information is necessary, if not as a determinant of/for favorable opinion, then at least to present a more complete picture of the events about to unfold. It is essential to know the character development, in order to understand the direction(s) Dean Acheson took as a Statesman. As Acheson himself so succinctly phrased it, “many of the moralistic maxims adapted to the conduct of foreign affairs are apt to reflect personal prejudice or sententious sentiment.”

In 1893, the eldest child of Eleanor Gertrude Gooderham and Edward Campion Acheson was born: Dean Gooderham Acheson. His upper middle class family lived in Middletown, Connecticut, where his father a Bishop in the Episcopal Church. The family’s influence and income was considerably supplemented by Mrs. Acheson’s prosperous father, and so the Achesons lived quite well. They could afford to have Dean privately educated – Groton, Yale, Harvard Law. Never an exceptionally good student, Dean Acheson did manage to overcome the fecklessness of youth, and at law school did quite well. At Harvard he was a student of, and eventually became good friends with, Felix Frankfurter. Through Frankfurter’s connection with/to Justice Brandeis, Acheson was able to secure a clerkship (with Brandeis) at the United States Supreme Court. He would clerk for Brandeis for two years, and become an ardent admirer of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. He joined the Washington law firm of Rublee/Covington and did the
business of lawyering. His was a successful career, but not an altogether remarkable period in Acheson’s life.\(^7\)

In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved his nomination for and subsequent appointment to and confirmation as United States Under Secretary of the Treasury (with William Woodin serving as Secretary).\(^8\) There were two things which militated against the probable success of this appointment: Dean Acheson knew nothing about the function of a bureaucrat and he knew even less about the world of finance/economics.\(^9\) There was a third ingredient in this cocktail for disaster. Shortly after Acheson was confirmed as Under Secretary, Woodin became gravely ill, and Acheson took his place as Acting Secretary of the Treasury.\(^10\) At this time, the Great Depression was well underway, and in an attempt to bring the economy of the United States under control, and restore some stability to the commercial markets, Roosevelt believed that an artificial manipulation of the price of gold may be the best course of action to revive the economy. He thus ordered his Acting Secretary to actively engage in the execution of this plan.\(^11\) At first, Acheson demurred, believing the action, if not illegal, then at least beyond his purview. He would act at the President’s direction only reluctantly, and then only after denying any responsibility for such policy.\(^12\) Such behavior was not acceptable from a member of the President’s cabinet, and Acheson was asked to resign.\(^13\) The enmity which Acheson bore toward Franklin D. Roosevelt would last to the end of his life.\(^14\) Acheson would accept little blame for this humiliation which he had brought upon himself. However, there were valuable lessons here, and Acheson learned them well.\(^15\)

Dean Acheson was a bureaucrat and bureaucrats are functionaries. He would become the quintessential bureaucratic in-fighter and jealously guard his department from those who would wish to intrude. Effective high level bureaucrats must be the best functioning executives. They must not only manage the business at hand and the department, but they must also know the difference between what they desire personally by way of action and what the needs are of those for whom they work. If one is to be held responsible for policy, one would want to be part of the decision making process, and if one is to be part of the decision making process, that person must be proactive, and proactive means contribution and compromise. For Acheson, contribution meant preparedness (knowledge) and compromise extended primarily to particulars, not principle – to his professional life, but not to his private life.

Fortunately for Acheson, the professional and personal indignities he suffered as a result of his uncanny ability to be “hoist[ed] on one’s own petard,” were not fatal. The days spent in the wilderness would stretch for eight years, ending in 1941. His nemesis, Franklin D. Roosevelt, approved his appointment as Assistant Secretary of State (with Cordell Hull being Secretary).\(^16\) Although this reappointment was politically motivated, Dean Acheson was not a “politician.” His close association with the Democratic Party, and, again, his friendship with Frankfurter were instrumental in this resurrection, but it appears that it was Roosevelt himself who took the initiative to bring Acheson back into public service.\(^17\) His impression of the State Department under Hull was one “…without direction…adrift, carried hither and yon by the currents of war or pushed about by collisions with more purposeful craft.”\(^18\) He was not disappointed, but neither was he impressed.
Assigned to Economic Affairs, Acheson was relegated to approving material shipments to and from the United States and various other countries – not in the realm of policy making. Edward Stettinius, Hull’s successor as Secretary, reshuffled the department and reassigned Acheson to Congressional Liaison (while he still served as an Assistant Secretary). In Economic Affairs and as Congressional Liaison, Acheson was able to see firsthand how the legislative processes of the United States worked, i.e., “its actual role in our scheme of government as against the constitutional theory of it.” In addition, he was able to see which representatives were responsible for making the legislative process work. Stettinius’s tour of duty as Secretary was quite brief. “Snow White,” as Stettinius was affectionately referred to by Acheson, was succeeded by James Byrnes in July 1945. For Acheson, who had never been very impressed by Stettinius’s performance within the State Department, the Secretary’s departure was of no significant loss.

Acheson tendered his resignation, it was accepted, and in August of 1945 he was again about to engage in the profession of lawyering. Within a week, as fate would have it and as he himself would later remark, “I was to learn how vast a part luck plays in our lives,” Acheson was United States Under Secretary of State (pending confirmation) – his resignation having been accepted and then rescinded within days of submission. Acheson did have misgivings about this decision to return to the State Department. He was “acutely conscious that [he] was entering Indian country.” As the case would be, Acheson held this job as Under Secretary of State for six-hundred seventy-two days. Secretary Byrnes would spend most of his time out of the country (of his 562 days as Secretary, Byrnes was away for 350 of them) and thus, the business of running the Department of State fell to Acheson. As a result of Byrnes’s absence, Acheson became Acting Secretary and was thus required to attend the President’s cabinet meetings. Dean Acheson had now moved to the center of policy debate, his counsel being sought and his input seriously considered. However, Acheson’s effectiveness was seriously undermined by Byrnes who would occasionally by-pass or contradict his Under Secretary in personnel and policy matters. As Acheson recalled, “the lines of command [during his time under Byrnes] were not clear.”

The work to which he would expend all of his effort was daunting, “the enormity of the task...after the wars in Europe and Asia ended in 1945, only slowly revealed itself...to create a world out of chaos.” However, Acheson did not hesitate to engage the challenge before him. Two critical points soon became evident if he was to make a positive and lasting contribution. The first involved the role of the State Department. Roosevelt was his own Secretary of State and hence the function and status of the Department fell into a state of desuetude, its counsel not sought nor heeded. Acheson worked to restore the Department to its historically preeminent position within the cabinet, by being knowledgeable about all matters that would rightfully fall under the purview of State, and then ensuring against incursions by other departments on its territory. It also helped that President Truman was predisposed to considering the Department of State in a favorable light.

The second critical point was to serve as faithfully and accurately the needs of his President. Concerning this latter condition, Secretary Byrnes appeared to be woefully inadequate, especially when it came to keeping the President advised of negotiations and discussions with foreign governments. For Byrnes, this shortcoming would have fatal
consequences (as Secretary of State). Yet for Acheson this would again be no great loss. He thought little more of Byrnes's performance as Secretary of State than that of either of his two predecessors.

In February 1946, Joseph Stalin outlined in "brutal clarity" that Soviet foreign policy would not include peaceful coexistence. Shortly thereafter, George Kennan (United States Charge d'affaires, Moscow) followed this with his "Long Telegram," warning that the United States should be prepared for an extended political struggle with the Soviets, who could only be satisfied with the dominance and destruction of all things not communist. Americans' sympathies toward their Russian war allies began to change, and Truman, the politician, was quick to take note of this. However, he did not demand that his executive advisors blindly follow (most of them owed their allegiance and positions to Roosevelt and displayed only minimal loyalty to Truman). Acheson was a case in point. According to several historians, such as Robert Beisner and James Chace, Acheson at this point in time was not overly concerned and still felt that some common ground could be found on which to base diplomatic relations with Russia. For example, Acheson's continued work on international atomic energy control is cited as evidence of his belief that cooperative ties with the Soviets could be still be established. In all fairness, it should be noted that Acheson did not volunteer for this particular assignment.

The midterm elections of 1946 clearly demonstrated dissatisfaction with the policies of the Democratic Party and foreign policy was not an exception. The Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, who had advocated a more conciliatory approach toward the Soviet Union, had set off an internecine cabinet fight with Secretary Byrnes, a fight which had caused a rift within the Democratic Party. In the case of Truman, it did not take too much convincing that Russia was not to be trusted. Early on, Truman had seen the weakness of his predecessor's treatments with Russia and quickly abandoned that tack. Acheson's conversion took a little longer, but it was no less sincere. The part the United States was to play internationally was becoming, if anything, much clearer. It was also becoming equally evident that resolution of the Soviet problem would involve addressing issues not only in Europe, but also in Asia. The United States had to assume leadership in this struggle against communism and could not revert to its historical sanctuary of isolationism.

President Truman gave General George C. Marshall the assignment to assess the situation in China and advise as to the best course of action to be pursued vis-à-vis the communist/nationalist struggle. Acheson was appointed Marshall's Washington liaison through whom all information would be relayed to the President and vice versa. This was a particularly awkward position for Acheson because he now had to serve two masters, President Truman and Secretary Byrnes.

At this time, the question of policy in regards to the use of atomic weapons/nuclear power needed to be addressed and so, Acheson (Lilienthal) was appointed to the advisory commission. In January of 1946, Secretary Byrnes appointed Dean Acheson to chair a committee which was to develop policy proposals for the control of atomic energy. Acheson gathered a distinguished board of members and by the following March, a working draft was being circulated: the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. The proposal recommended, after a period of transition, that control would pass from the United States to an international body. At the time of the draft's release,
Secretary Byrnes recommended to President Truman the appointment of Bernard Baruch as United States delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch assembled his own committee to consider atomic energy control and by the end of April, had a proposal. The ensuing dust-up with Acheson was predictable, when Baruch was able to get the President to endorse his proposal over the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. The denouement in this little drama was that neither plan was ever adopted, and Bernard Baruch had one less friend in the world.

In addition to the issue of using atomic weapons/nuclear power, appropriate response to matters, such as those regarding Palestine, South America, Soviet intentions in Western Germany/Japan and its interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and especially the problems confronting the Western European nations became the responsibility of the office of the Under Secretary at this time. Unhappy with Byrnes’s style, President Truman chose George C. Marshall to be the next United States Secretary of State (January 1947). Acheson’s reacted to this change of command thusly: “This whole episode is a thoroughly unhappy memory.” Once again, Acheson tendered his resignation, it becoming effective in July 1947. However, much was to happen before this departure.

This “change of command” might not have been to Acheson’s liking, but President Truman’s choice of General George Catlett Marshall to succeed James Byrnes as Secretary of State could not have been better. There are very few people to whom Dean Acheson gave ungrudging respect, and besides the two mentioned in this paragraph (Truman and Marshall) could only be added Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes – an observation only as it concerns Acheson’s professional, not personal life. Rarely did Acheson pay a compliment to anyone without a back-handed reservation. In this regard, Acheson particularly liked Douglas Southhall Freeman’s assessment of his (i.e., Acheson’s) own attitude: “Acheson found it difficult to conceal his contempt for the contemptible.”

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman delivered an address to a joint session of Congress requesting aid for both Greece and Turkey – this speech for ever after was known as the Truman Doctrine. Joseph M. Jones (State Department, Public Affairs) was the primary writer, but the real force behind this speech was Dean Acheson who had insisted that this speech be “precisely formulated” in order to give its full, intended effect. The necessity for this action was not unanticipated. Both Secretary Byrnes and his successor, Marshall, had been aware of the deteriorating conditions engulfing the two nations in particular and Europe in general. In addition, both men had instructed Acheson to prepare for this eventuality. As Acheson would later reflect, during this particular period of activity,

The financial effort was immense. So were the production and military efforts. But...the real achievement...lies, I think, in the boldness, the imaginativeness, the creativeness of the thinking, and perhaps most of all in the will which those in charge maintained and communicated to the country. This stemmed straight from President Truman himself. The sustained leadership and effort...represented a revolution in American foreign policy and the assumption of burdens and responsibilities wholly new to us.
By late 1946, time and events had overwhelmed the governments of Greece and Turkey. They could no longer deal effectively with the problems with which they were faced.\textsuperscript{51} Political and economic turmoil had wracked both countries since the cessation of armed conflict in 1945. The economy of Greece needed constant infusions from outside sources, and the communists had engaged in an armed rebellion to take power.\textsuperscript{52} The British had managed to keep the Greek government from going into bankruptcy, and it was only the British presence which had temporarily checked the communist insurgency. Turkey had similar economic difficulties, but its real threat had come from without. Stalin had been pressuring Turkey to establish joint control of the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{53} In 1946, there was every indication that it might come at the cost of a military invasion of Turkish territory by Russia.\textsuperscript{54}

The situation was becoming more precarious with each passing day in the new year. On Friday, February 21, 1947, Acheson took delivery of a “blue piece of paper” from Britain’s United States representative, Lord Inverchapel.\textsuperscript{55} In diplomatic parlance, this was a formal communication between governments – the advising of one country by another of actions intended or already taken which might affect the policy, and/or interests of the receiving government. In this particular instance, Great Britain indicated that it would no longer be able to maintain its support of Greece and Turkey either economically or militarily, and it was soon to withdraw from the area. The cost of this unmandated protection was beyond either the ability or the will of England to bear. England’s own economy was in need of attention, and public support for continued action in Greece had been exhausted.\textsuperscript{56} For Acheson, this development, though not specifically foreseen, necessarily had to be factored into any American program of relief. As Acheson saw the situation, America alone had the material, political, and economic means to provide relief.\textsuperscript{57}

Having already been instructed to prepare plans for direct aid, it was a matter for Acheson only to gather, collate, and assemble the material in some cogent and understandable format. This he did throughout that weekend (February 22\textsuperscript{nd} – 23rd). He advised his bosses, Truman and Marshall, of developments and asked their input.\textsuperscript{58} Neither could offer anything by way of addition or improvement to Acheson’s work. From the standpoint of State Department involvement, it was through Acheson’s efforts that the plan was ready for presentation that Monday (February 24\textsuperscript{th}) following receipt of England’s advisory note.\textsuperscript{59} Truman’s reaction was immediate: the proposal would go forward because the security of the nation demanded it, and “the consequences of inaction were clear enough.”\textsuperscript{60} Acheson, having made his case to Truman and Marshall, presented the facts to legislative leaders, at the White House. Approaching the meeting “with our congressional masters,” Acheson described the urgency of the matter thusly, “I knew we were met at Armageddon...never have I spoken under such a pressing sense that the issue was up to me alone.”\textsuperscript{61} The Congressional leaders proved, for the most part, to be receptive to the presentation made to them by and at the request of the Under Secretary (through the President, of course). The press was also given the same presentation by Acheson, by the end of that same week.\textsuperscript{62}

Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) was an early supporter of the proposal and he would shepherd the subsequent bill authorizing relief through his Senate Foreign Relations Committee – and voting for adoption upon release for full Senate approval.\textsuperscript{63}
As Acheson described it, Vandenberg’s “part in the enactment of this proposal into law was invaluable.” Opposition was minimal and had little impact on the final bill - a niggling criticism raised by Walter Lippmann resulted in lip service being paid to the United Nations, an organization for which Acheson had little regard (although he was never injudicious to the point of publicly denouncing it while in State service). Acheson appeared numerous times before Senate and House committees treating of the proposal. Acheson offered testimony in support of the bill, at one point addressing one-eleven questions brought up by inquiring legislators. The Greek-Turkey Aid Act was approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Truman on May 22, 1947.

Greece and Turkey would receive approximately $400,000,000.00 ($250,000,000 to Greece and $150,000,000 to Turkey) in aid under this bill. Over the ensuing years, Greece would receive over one billion dollars in U.S. assistance (it appears that Britain had accurately assessed the financial situation). For the United States, and Dean Acheson in particular, this event had repercussions that went far beyond economic and military relief. For Acheson, it was as an epiphany, an awakening to a reality of which he was aware, but not cognizant. That reality involved a Communist Russia which he now perceived as evil. Content heretofore with a kind of live and let live attitude, Acheson now moved to a more hardened resolve in his dealings with the Russia which he now considered “an eager and ruthless opponent.” He had been mistakenly accused of “appeasement” in his prior considerations of U.S.–Soviet Union relations. In reality, Acheson’s early position was a kind of benign accommodation (not “appeasement” and certainly not sympathy). Heretofore a Washington warrior, Acheson would take on an additional role as a Cold warrior.

Russia would not be discouraged or dissuaded by words or by example: “the Soviets negotiate by acts and not debate, offer and counteroffer. Their purpose may be to separate allies or undermine governments...win over uncommitted peoples. Or...to bring a sense of relaxation, good-will, security, before...some energetic offensive.” As such, Acheson recognized that only action would be of use against Soviet designs. Russia’s constant probing for weakness of resolve and unity among the United States and its allies had to be aggressively countered if the specter of totalitarianism was to be overcome. Acheson sought policies which would lead to positions of strength, and if at the same time such policies could undermine the Soviet programs, then so much the better. He cast aside anything that threatened to harm his security interests. Furthermore, Acheson believed that if any action was of benefit to his opponent, it had to be doubly avoided. Yet the actions of Russia were not the only source that motivated Acheson to change. Domestic pressures were also probably equally responsible for this redirection in Acheson’s thinking.

In this atmosphere, the politics of containment began to take shape. The crises in Greece and Turkey evidenced an urgent need to stem the tide and influence of the ever expansionist-minded Stalin. The old European order was not able to counter, by any means, the push of Russia by itself, but it was necessary to preserve the illusion that some resistance would be made, and Acheson committed himself to the task of building this allied resistance until it became a real force: “no balance of power in Europe or elsewhere, adequate to restrain Soviet power is possible unless the weight of the United States is put into the scales, without association with the United States, the European
powers cannot prevent the leaders of the Soviet Union from having their way in Western Europe” – an observation made by Acheson at a much later date, but consistently applicable. He knew that although the United States was the strongest of all the liberal democracies, its resources were not limitless. It could not be everything, to everyone, everywhere, all of the time. He would build upon those countries which appeared to have the best prospects for success. This plan for rebuilding would of necessity require the resuscitation of the political and economic machines of both Germany and Japan and eventually, their respective military capabilities if the Soviets were to be check-mated. By intervening in Greece and Turkey, the United States (read also, Acheson) demonstrated its (his) willingness to be the leader of the free world and America’s allies paid close attention.

In ideology, technology and historical tradition, the United States was closest to Western Europe and so it was little wonder that Acheson focused his rebuilding efforts on America’s former allies. Western European political ideology tended to the same liberal democracy found in America. Technologically, Western European and American industry were on familiar terms. The historical traditions of both reflect basically the same cultural values. Economically and financially, Western Europe and the United States were oriented toward free market capitalism (arguments in regards to colonialism and imperialism aside). Acheson thus, turned to the task of restoring and revivifying the agriculture, industry, and trade of Europe. A strong Europe would be America’s first defense against a communist Russia:

There developed on our Atlantic coast a community, which has spread across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, because they are based on moral conviction, on acceptance of the same values in life...

The Marshall Plan was the direct result of the Truman Doctrine, but the ideas, ideals, and problems that the plan sought to address (like the Doctrine itself) had been accumulating for some time previous. Long before the Second World War had concluded, the need for effective post-war management of world affairs had been anticipated. Though not an economist, Acheson could readily appreciate the complex financial arrangements which would have to be made if there was to be an orderly transition from the war-time economy, having served as head of a committee whose purpose was to develop plans for this very possibility in 1941 (albeit he could not recall a single meeting). The problem with which Acheson was faced was what fiscal policy would best ensure the reinvigoration and restoration of a business climate conducive to stability and at the same time, be compatible with foreign policy and vice versa. Responsible fiscal policy and effective foreign policy would have to be mutually inclusive.

Post-war global economic dislocation was the reality. The most important priority was to ensure that adequate food supplies be distributed as and where needed. The newly minted United Nations would be the first point of coordination for such relief, and for the most part, the financial end of it was underwritten by the United States.
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established for the purpose of relief/food distribution, under the direction of Fiorella La Guardia. In the beginning, both President Truman and Acheson both supported UNRRA’s efforts, with Acheson at one point urging government seizure of needed materials in order to maintain effective levels of assistance: “Emphasizing that he was expressing his personal views, Mr. Acheson told a news conference that the government should go out and take the wheat and flour it needed to make foreign commitments.”

The United Nations’ effort soon ran afoul of United States domestic politics, when it was discovered that certain nations accepting relief/food were doing so at the expense of maintaining and expanding their national armies. Yugoslavia was the case in point with Tito, its communist leader, having done just this. The displeasure of the American electorate was expressed at the polls in the November 1946 mid-term elections in which “the Democrats lost control of congress for the first time in sixteen years.” As a result, support for UNRRA was withdrawn and the United States would establish its own relief/food effort, on its own terms, and in what it perceived to be its interests (and those of its allies).

Throughout early 1947, plans were being prepared to provide U.S.-sponsored relief to replace that which was to be discarded, but on an even broader scale. However, it was not until late spring that anything concrete began developing. Acheson had been working with various other departments on the issue, and within the State Department, Marshall had directed the new Policy Planning Staff to take up the matter (also to be overseen by Acheson). By May the “Marshall Plan” began to take shape. In this plan, the United States would finance European reconstruction by utilizing a combination of grants and loans to stimulate growth and consumption. Relief was not the purpose of the plan. As the plan evolved, it was modified and interpreted to overcome opposition from the American people and their elected representatives.

Acheson was the first to publicly broach the government’s economic assistance initiative – first to the League of Women Voters (Washington, DC), and then to the Delta Council (Cleveland, Mississippi): “It is one of the principle aims of our foreign policy...to use our economic and financial resources...[as]...necessary if we are to preserve our own freedom and our own democratic institutions. It is necessary for national security and it is our duty and privilege as human beings.” Acheson would also take care to alert foreign news correspondents beforehand. These were trial runs to gauge public reaction to a program that would only entail more sacrifice on the part of Americans – the same voters who had just recently expressed their frustration in November. Acheson, the Statesman, had now turned salesman and crusader in the cause of “one of the greatest and most honorable adventures in history.”

On June 5th, Secretary Marshall would announce “The Plan” at Harvard’s commencement ceremonies. Twenty-four days later, Acheson resigned. He returned to private life and to his practice of the law. Yet Acheson did not like being away from government. He likened this period away from public life to the withdrawal period experienced by a drug addict, a period marked by “anguish and unhappiness.” “Public life,” as Acheson described it, “is not only a powerful stimulant but a habit forming one.”

His resignation had been in arrangement since Marshall had taken over as Secretary of State (it was only because of Marshall’s personal request of Acheson that
Acheson remained as long as he did in his position. Robert Lovett became Acheson’s replacement. Acheson returned to private life and the practice of law ostensibly for the purpose of replenishing his dwindling financial reserves, a matter of which he always complained. This arrangement was not to his liking. His professional connections to government work might have been severed, but not his personal ones. Within two weeks of his departure, he was nominated by President Truman to be a member of the Hoover Commission which was to recommend improvements to government executive management (none of its suggestions were ever adopted). In October, Truman would appoint Acheson to the position of Chairman United States Section of the Permanent American-Canadian Defense Board. This appointment was subsequently found to be inconsistent with laws that prohibited private citizens from being appointed to any such position, if in their capacity as a private citizen they could bring legal action against the United States.

By November 1947, the Committee for the Marshall Plan, a lobbying group intent on getting the Marshall Plan adopted, occupied most of Acheson’s time. He was a member of the executive board, but even more important, he was one of the group’s founders “calling for timely and effective American aid for devastated Europe.” Acheson appeared in cities throughout the United States, such as San Francisco, Minneapolis, and Atlantic City, speaking on behalf of the program and the necessity for its adoption. He also appeared on radio discussion panels as an advocate of assistance for Europe. In these presentations, Acheson struck a different pose in his attitude toward Russia.

The great humanitarian effort was beginning to take on a more adversarial tone as regards Russian intentions. A more confrontational approach began to be pursued by the United States. Passage of a bill for European assistance was not only the humane thing to be done, but also something crucial to America’s national security interest. The Committee’s campaign of European recovery was now being interpreted in terms of world peace threatened by Soviet expansionism and domination – “We live in dangerous times because of the decisions of another power.” He would engage the politics of fear to get his point across. Acheson testified before Senate committees in support of the resolution for European aid, stating that “this is the hour of decision; this is the time in which we cannot falter.” Acheson always deplored demagoguery and he was close to the boundary here.

The Foreign Assistance Act was signed by President Truman in April 1948. The following day, the President asked Acheson if he would be the program’s administrator. Acheson declined the request, suggesting Paul Hoffman in his stead. Hoffmann accepted, and was readily accepted by the Republicans who would vote for the program’s funding. The Presidential election campaigns were beginning in earnest shortly after this resolution had passed, and since nothing focused political attention more than this quadrennial event and was usually at the expense of all other government business. That was unless, of course, that business may have had a direct bearing on the race for President.

At this time (August 1948), the Alger Hiss case would begin to make its way through history, and Acheson would be inextricably linked to the matter. Alger Hiss had been accused of spying for the Soviet Union while employed by the United States Department of State. He had allegedly used his position to access vital information
which he then turned over to the Soviets. Hiss had denied the accusation, but was subsequently found guilty of a lesser charge of perjury in this matter and sentenced to five years imprisonment. Acheson’s involvement in the case was more than a little circumstantial, and he made his part worse by stating, during his confirmation hearings in January 1949, that Alger Hiss was his friend, and that he would not turn his back on him. The attacks on Acheson because of his association with Hiss cannot be minimized. Demand was made for his dismissal from government service, and although this would never be brought to that conclusion, Acheson found that he had been “discredited, his reputation [had been] damaged, and his political usefulness [had been] greatly damaged.”

The incident did have another effect: it created an atmosphere of fear that was difficult to separate from the business at hand. It forced people, especially those in government, to harden themselves against accusations of being communist sympathizers. Actions and policies would have to bear the anti-communist imprimatur, or risk rejection, along with their authors. The popular mood did not entertain cordial relations with countries whose ideological predilections were antithetical to those of the United States. Coexistence was also a questionable position to advocate. Fear and hysteria would be the tools of Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin (again pulling Acheson into a domestic crisis in which he did little but make his part worse), but that is beyond this story.

The United States presidential campaign and election of 1948 was at best a grim prospect for Harry S. Truman, his chance for success seemed very remote. Overcoming an intraparty fight with the Dixiecrats to become the Democratic Party candidate, it was an uphill battle against the Republican nominee, Thomas Dewey. In a close election, which had been all but conceded to Dewey by all the major polling companies (and not a few newspapers even after the fact), Truman won by a narrow margin. This was an especially surprising victory after the 1946 mid-term elections in which the Democrats had suffered a devastating defeat. Following this win, President Truman set about reorganizing his Cabinet. Dean Acheson was his choice to replace George C. Marshall as Secretary of State. The reason Dean Acheson was selected over other prominent candidates (e.g. Chief Justice Fred Vinson; United States Ambassador to Great Britain, Lewis Douglas) was explained later by Acheson himself:

President Truman’s policies had been evolved with the help of two secretaries of state. I had served them both as their Under Secretary and knew something of the circumstances and problems the Presidents actions had been designed to meet and the need for steadiness and continuity...to be frank, forthright and vigorous in counsel; energetic and loyal in accepting decisions and carrying them out.

Domestic issues tend to dominate national politics and elections. Foreign policy, important though it may be, is considered in terms of its impact on domestic tranquility, and how it comports with the democratic ideals of the republic. As a direct result, most foreign policy activity during these times finds itself relegated to the background. This was the case effecting ongoing international negotiations/discussions as to an Atlantic security pact among Western European countries with an eye to involving the United
States. Talks for establishing an Atlantic mutual defense organization had been well under way by the time Dean Acheson was chosen and confirmed as Secretary of State. However, generally speaking, possible involvement of the United States was not a widely debated issue. The Department of State and the Pentagon discussed amongst themselves, and their European counterparts, the role the United States could play in such a group. In point of fact, there was really little (public) progress made in the development of such a pact beyond what had been proposed at the Brussels Pact in the spring of 1948, a meeting in which the United States played no official role, but did endorse the action.

The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries had met at Brussels and agreed that some sort of alliance was necessary to ensure against “any policy of aggression” that might be generated by another against one of its members. This was to be a military mutual assistance pact, and although Germany was the only nation mentioned as a possible source of aggression in the agreement itself, it was clearly intended to counter Russian policy. Just as obvious as this tacit challenge to Russia’s aggressive expansionism, was the inability of this group to offer any real resistance without the participation of the United States. There was always the United Nations as a possible counterweight to Russian incursions, but the agreement at Brussels reflected little confidence in the former’s ability to effectively deal with the matter of security. Acheson set about immediately to continue discussions for U.S. inclusion in this mutual security pact.

It is important to note that Acheson never acted without Truman’s acquiescence, if not beforehand then immediately thereafter; Acheson always kept his boss apprised of his doings, and in policy matters, Acheson was always careful that he reflected what the President would need. Both the President’s and Acheson’s public pronouncements on foreign policy were coordinated to avoid the appearance of contradiction, and the President was not hesitant to defer to his Secretary for clarification and explication of State Department programs. It was no different when it came time to involving the United States in the Atlantic treaty pact.

Acheson knew from his experience that it was always better to be too prepared than otherwise, and upon becoming secretary, he would follow this course of action as regards the Atlantic pact. He continued negotiations in private (not in secret) until the moot points began to emerge. The first points to be overcome had to do with the language and intent of the proposed pact. The intent, “a program of mutual protection,” was the easy part, but Acheson had to reconcile the language of the agreement with Constitutional restrictions and requirements and balance this with the security needs and assurances sought by the other signatories. The language of the agreement took somewhat longer to work out because of the numerous agendas which had to be serviced. Basically, the Brussels pact was a reformulation of the treaty of Rio de Janeiro (translated into a European framework) to which the United States was already a signatory, and so that provided Acheson with a working framework. The Rio Pact between the United States and its western hemispheric allies was concluded in 1947, pledging, among other things, mutual support in the event of attack, and, as mentioned above in this article, the Rio Pact served as a template for the soon to be approved North Atlantic Treaty’s article #5. Under Acheson, certain areas of foreign
diplomacy suffered from benign neglect (the sub-continent of Asia, Africa), but the Latin America (Central, South, and Caribbean) were victims of criminal neglect. Russia had evidenced little interest in the area, and this presented no threat to United States security. Consequently, very little American economic, political, or military aid was extended to Latin America. But Acheson’s attitude toward these countries and their peoples leaves little to his credit. It can at best be said that he did not allow them to be put in harm’s way.

Articles #3, #5, and #9 in the final pact proved the most troublesome for Acheson’s campaign to have the pact attain congressional approval. To overcome these difficulties, Acheson made a number of assurances to the Senate Committee. Article #3 indicated the development and maintenance of individual and collective capacity for armed resistance. Acheson stressed that the “mutual aid” called for in this particular article meant that the country would not be expected to supply an exorbitant amount of resources (e.g., medical supplies, “manpower, productive capacity, military equipment, etc.”). Rather, the United States would only have to contribute such resources at “reasonable” levels, levels which were consistent with its geographic location and resources. When queried as to whether this would involve the placement of U.S. troops in Europe, Acheson somewhat disingenuously replied “no.” However, when that possibility did become a reality and he was confronted about it, Acheson would still refuse to accept it as his fault.

Article #5 stipulated that an armed attack against one or more member countries in Europe or North America was to be considered an attack against all member nations, and, as consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, which recognized the right to individual or collective self-defense, member nations could take such action as deemed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, to include the use of armed force. Curiously it was the insertion of this last phrase, “to include the use of armed force,” which won Senate support of the article.

Article #9 established and described the composition of the NATO council, which would have the authority to establish a defense committee whose purpose was to implement articles #3 and #5. Furthermore, “each government... [would remain]...the judge of what actions it should take in the fulfillment of this treaty.” This article was interpreted by Acheson (to Congressional representatives) as meaning any declaration of war would be subject to approval (as was consistent with the United States constitution). In this way, the prerogatives of the Congress would not be usurped. In closing his talks with the Senate Committee, Acheson stressed the following:

The essential purpose of the treaty is to fortify and preserve this common way of life. It is designed to contribute to this maintenance of peace by making clear in advance the determination of the parties resolutely and collectively to resist armed attack on any of them. It is further designed to contribute to the stability and well-being of the member nations by removing the haunting sense of insecurity and enabling them to plan and work with confidence in the future. Finally, it is designed to provide the basis for effective collective action to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area if an armed attack should occur.
“Why...entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice?”—the foundation of America’s isolationism as expressed by George Washington, and the hallmark of United States foreign policy since the foundation of the Republic was gently pushed aside in April 1949. The United States was now the economic and military leader of the Western powers. From its beginnings as a handful of nations at the Western periphery of Europe who had gathered at Brussels to form their mutual assistance pact, Acheson (not alone of course) had translated the idea into an organization second to none in power and influence. The threat to international stability was not lessened by the establishment of NATO, but rather, substantially increased. The reaction from Russia was as expected negative and this new reality (i.e., NATO) was viewed as but a temporary impediment to Soviet dedication to the spread of communism. It may very well have been Acheson’s intention to build a better peace (and in the long term that is what happened), but it was hardly evident at this point in time. Acheson had helped craft the ultimate “situation of strength” for the United States. He had demonstrated the United States’ willingness to back up its words with action (armed action armed if that was necessary) as well as to preserve peace and ensure freedom. In doing this, Acheson helped America abandon its tradition of isolationism:

The outside world, as it actually existed, was grim and forbidding with heavy burdens and responsibilities attached to power. On the other side contrasting with it, was the memory of the world as it had been, and as one wished it might be. Between must lie error and fault.

Concurrent with the development of the North Atlantic Pact, there had been discussions of a Military Aid Program (during Acheson’s hiatus from government service) which was to be a supplement to the economic provisions of the Marshall Plan. This program was consistent with the North Atlantic Pact, but separate from it. As Acheson described it, “both [North Atlantic Pact and Military Aid Program] flowed from a common source.” The object was to establish “a force in Europe that would preclude a quick victory by sudden marches, backed by an American capability for punishing blows against an aggressor’s home territory.” The illusion of resistance was to be replaced by a reality, which would in turn be reinforced by U.S. atomic weapons. Acheson would see this plan through to its adoption and once again, it would be with the stubborn assistance of Senator Vandenberg of Michigan. The final Congressional approval of the Senate version of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the base of the Military Aid Program having been expanded to include United States military interests in Asia, was passed in October of 1949, shortly after the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb.

With calm deliberation, Acheson pursued a foreign policy which was gradually becoming more militant. He had grown the North Atlantic pact to almost triple its original membership and not without hard bargaining. American economic and technological support was prioritized, members of NATO receiving first consideration, and then nonmembers. If there was anything left, thus, the Scandinavian (Norway) countries were brought into line. Potential members, as identified by the United States, could choose whatever course of action they deemed in their best interest. However,
Acheson felt obligated to point out to these countries the benefits and consequences which were attendant upon declining the invitation.\textsuperscript{146} It soon became apparent to non-aligned nations that a decision would have to be made as to what would and who could insure national viability. Neutrality would not be acceptable in this ever polarized atmosphere.

However, as Acheson consolidated his diplomatic holdings, he was moving inexorably toward a position in which his options were becoming more and more limited. The conditions he was preparing would begin to dictate his course of action. In an inevitable slide to the right, he would find it difficult to change direction. His foreign policy became less flexible and more predictable. Acheson came to believe that there was only so much that could be done from a defensive posture, and began to anticipate, prepare for, and initiate foreign policy offensives. In Acheson’s mind, a reactionary foreign policy which was always on the defensive could not be effective. In addition, such policy appeared weak. As a result, such policy would only serve to work to the Soviets’ advantage.

By the close of 1949, the intensity of the Cold War had drawn the lines of conflict as they would remain for its duration. The classic cold war policies and strategies of the competing halves would be set firmly in place during this time. The constant probing by the Soviet Union at what appeared to be weak spots in the Western alliance, and the counterthrust would be the leitmotif of the war’s continuation. The West would increase political and diplomatic pressure by and through any means it could take advantage of while the Kremlin would seek to create doubt and disunity among the western allies. There was another element added to this international tension: the possibility of mutual annihilation by means of atomic weapons.\textsuperscript{147} That Russia would at some point enter the atomic age was never in doubt, but it was anticipated that the United States would retain its exclusive access to this technology for some years to come. Russia’s successful atom bomb test, coupled with the communist takeover of China, by Mao Zedong, ended the year 1949 badly for Acheson and the West.\textsuperscript{148}

At this time, Western confidence was shaken. In the event of armed conflict between East and West, West Europeans and Americans never doubted that the battle would be nearly over before the West could mount any effective defense. However, they were reasonably certain that they would eventually survive and be able to fight on. United States’s atomic weaponry had been seen as providing the time necessary for the West to mobilize a defense. Yet this frame of mind had been altered when it became clear that Russia could counter an attack with atomic weapons of its own.\textsuperscript{149} Such a reality negated the tactical edge of Russia’s rivals. The strategy whereby Russian advances could be contained now took on a much different appearance and required immediate attention. In January 1950, President Truman instructed the State Department (Acheson as Secretary of State) and the Department of Defense (Louis Johnson as Secretary) to assess this atomic threat and make policy recommendations per the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{150}

The policy paper which would eventually emerge was known as NSC-68. Its primary author was Paul Nitze, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, but the final product was the essential Acheson.\textsuperscript{151} Acheson oversaw and controlled the ideas which would or would not be included in the document from the beginning of the process to its final presentation for President Truman’s consideration. Specifically, the President
was seeking an assessment of Soviet capabilities in managing fissionable materials and with possible Russian development of thermonuclear devices. The latter was especially important because the United States was on the verge of developing its own hydrogen bomb, a thermonuclear weapon, and beside the moral implications involved in the debate over development, was the feasibility of diverting the scarce and essential fissionable materials toward this program, at the expense of atomic armament production. Acheson addressed these concerns, but he also saw the opportunity to broaden the scope of the policy’s application.

The mechanism of the National Security Council was a rather new innovation itself, having only been established by means of the National Security Act in 1947. Yet the Council’s introduction as a consultative body was not well received by either the President or his Secretary of State. Until the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Truman rarely attended any of its meetings, believing the Council was only a stalking horse for congressional legislators who had no business in this area. Likewise, Acheson was wary of the Council and considered it a threat to the mission of the State Department. As such, he considered it a nuisance. Yet he also recognized that to abandon the Council to its own devices would merely create more problems than the bureaucrat in Acheson would allow. He would not debate the problem of the Security Council, but as George Marshall would have directed, he managed it.

As information, viewpoints, assessments, recommendations were being assembled and weighed as to their relevance and efficacy, it became apparent within the State Department itself that there existed a philosophical divide. George Kennan (former Director of the Policy Planning staff) and Charles Bohlen argued for a much more abstruse approach than Acheson thought practical. As a result, Acheson rejected their approach. In the final version of NSC-68, the subject of the Soviet Union’s atomic capabilities was linked to an overarching armaments plan which would stand in direct opposition to any military threat from the Kremlin. It was a commitment by the United States to prepare itself and to use any means necessary to protect its national security and that of its allies from overt or covert communist incursions. This would include the use of conventional and atomic weapons. Acheson could see the adoption of this policy in its wider application to American foreign diplomacy i.e., a Western rearmament program able to withstand any onslaught from the east. As Acheson construed it, “the purpose of NSC-68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision be carried out.”

The final policy proposal (NSC-68) did not include any cost estimates, but this was by design. Acheson had purposefully omitted this particular point. Acheson knew that such military rehabilitation and rearmament would be costly and would require approximately fifty billion dollars a year into the foreseeable future. After having consulted knowledgeable sources, he considered the figure “well within [the] national economic capacity.” This expenditure he felt was vital to continued national security, but he saw that to have included cost estimates in the policy proposal would have worked against its adoption. Acheson believed that before the decision could be made to adopt the policy “in principle” the “mice in the Budget Bureau will nibble to death the will to decide.”

Methodically, the paper made and established its points. In its every word, phrase, and paragraph Acheson’s voice rang loud and clear. Negotiation with the Soviet
Union was steeply discounted and written off as a tool whereby Russia prolonged a problem not to search for resolution, but to see if any advantage was to be gained. As the document stressed, the Kremlin was not interested in words and thus, only action could command the Soviet Union’s attention and respect. Action reaffirmed resolve, anything less reflected weakness. Strong foreign policy would require military strength. Furthermore, the evidence of military strength and the will to use it would ensure the support of the United States’ allies. Essentially, NSC-68 laid out the ultimate containment strategy for it was purposed to be applied to Europe, Asia, Africa, as well as all of the Americas.\footnote{159}

As NSC-68 made clear, there were no gray areas to be considered at this time; everything was in black and white: democracy versus totalitarianism, freedom versus slavery, civilization versus annihilation. “Containment” as a continuing policy was considered an effective strategy with which to counter Soviet expansionism, and one that lent itself to the highly cherished American ideals of fairness and freedom. As implemented, this policy sought change just short of armed conflict. This policy also relied heavily on two other elements: time and military strength. Time allowed for reflection and reconsideration and also allowed for the seeds of self-destruction to take hold. On the other hand, military strength was “in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion.” \footnote{160} Containment provided not only the opportunity for negotiation, but also a source of pressure on the Kremlin to yield its hardened positions. The two alternative policy extremes of isolationism and preventive war were dismissed as untenable. The former was rejected because it failed to provide safeguards in the event of attack, and the latter was rejected because it was inconsistent and incompatible with American sensibilities – it would have been “morally corrosive” in the eyes of Americans. \footnote{161}

For the authors of NSC-68, there was no doubt that the United States and its allies had the resources, the capital, and the skills necessary to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. However, the authors also recognized that what was needed most was the will to act with a unity of purpose. Acheson was forever bedeviled by liberals who claimed that the only real threat emanated from weaknesses in the western societal, political, and economic structures of Europe. Yet Acheson did not let himself be swayed by the opposition. He remained firm in his position that the United States would be the deciding factor in any contest of wills.

Political, economic, and military preparedness for an anticipated confrontation with Russia was the end product of NSC-68. Armed conflict was not sought, nor was negotiation to be ignored in an effort to preserve the peace, but all had to stand in readiness for an impending clash – if it was ever to come between the United States/its allies and the Soviet Union. If the United States and its allies were to survive as free liberal democracies, then proactive positions had to be adopted. All of this had to be done “to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society.” \footnote{162} Nothing less than a rapid build up of these elements (political, economic, and military) would ensure the free world remained free. Every, and all, resource(s) available to the United States and its allies had to be mobilized “to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control.” \footnote{163} The stockpiling of atomic weaponry (and thermonuclear devices if they were proven to be effective) would proceed along with conventional weapons rearmament build-up for two reasons. The first reason was that it
was to be reasonably expected that Russia would adopt a similar program. The second reason was that the ever changing demands of armed conflict might require such weapons.

The NSC-68 document had been designed to be a collaborative effort, as directed by President Truman, undertaken by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. And for all intents and purposes, this was what the document was. Nearing completion of the work, a meeting was arranged with the respective staffs and Secretaries to go over the draft. However, when it came time to review the recommendation in its final stages before presentation, the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, took exception to the entire proceeding. He claimed that the project had been conducted without either his knowledge or input and refused to cooperate any further in the discussions. After a heated exchange with Acheson, Johnson left. In his future writings, Acheson would remark, “he [Johnson] was mentally ill...His conduct became too outrageous...some years later he underwent a brain operation.” A telephone call from President Truman settled the matter once and for all. Johnson signed off on the NSC-68 document when it was completed. The following September, Johnson was dismissed from his position as Defense Secretary.

Once the NSC-68 document was completed, Acheson knew that such a plan had to be brought to the public’s attention if it was to receive support because it would require unity and continued sacrifice if it was to be effective. In the final “Notes” appended to NSC-68, Acheson had the last word. He listed seven points that he believed if adhered to by the Soviets might avert an impending crisis. These conditions, if they were met by the Kremlin, could result in “coexistence in reasonable security.” Acheson did make parts of this policy a matter for public discussion and consideration in a number of different venues prior to its being given over to Truman in April of 1950, the same strategy he had employed with the Marshall Plan in 1947–1948.

Appearing as a guest speaker at the University of California, Berkeley, on March 16, 1950, Acheson delivered an address titled “Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.” In this speech, he iterated the (aforementioned) seven conditions which if met by the Soviet Union could lessen the tensions between the two countries. First, there must be developed a definition of terms of peace in relation to final settlement with former enemies, Germany, Austria, and Japan. Specifically, these terms had to allow for these former enemy countries to once again enter into the international community as autonomous, self-governing units. These countries could not be allowed to become mere satellites of the Soviet Union. Second, force should be renounced by the Russian authorities as a means of dominating “satellite” countries. Third, the Russians should put an end to their obstructionist tactics within the United Nations and allow the decision making process among the various member countries to go on undisturbed. This meant that the representatives of the Soviet Union in the United Nations had to stop boycotting and walking out during UN meetings. Fourth, the Soviet Union should join with the United States in making arrangements for the control of atomic weapons. Fifth, the Russians should cease all attempts to undermine established governments throughout the world. Sixth, the Soviet Union should take reasonable care to insure the proper treatment of diplomatic representatives. Seventh, Soviet leaders should refrain from systematically distorting to their own peoples the picture of the world outside of their own borders. In particular, the Soviets’ negative propaganda in reference to the United
States had to be discontinued. In closing his speech, Acheson urged his audience to recognize the importance of following through with such proactive foreign policy measures:

The times call for a total diplomacy equal to the task of defense against Soviet expansion and to the task of building the kind of world in which our way of life can flourish. We must continue to press ahead with the building of a free world which is strong in its faith and in its material progress. The alternative is to allow the free nations to succumb one by one to the erosive and encroaching processes of Soviet expansion.166

As Acheson recorded it, NSC-68 became national policy on April 25, 1950.167 However, “little did Acheson imagine that the very kind of aggression against which NSC-68 was designed to function would make possible its implementation.” The impetus for the policy’s adoption was supplied by the communists themselves, in the form of the Korean conflict which began in June 1950.168

In referring to Korea, another point in reference to Acheson’s foreign policy should be pointed out. In considering the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, NSC-68, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, it is hard to dispute the fact that Acheson’s policies (and hence, those of the United States) were “Eurocentric” in the main. Though this may be the case, Acheson did in fact have an extensive Asian policy program with Japan as the centerpiece. Although Acheson may have been a bit late in coming into the game, and that even though he may not have specifically formulated Asian policy, Acheson was well aware of the importance of the Asian area and as such, he appointed capable assistants to devise appropriate policies.

On many occasions, Acheson had reason to be concerned with developments in Asia. One might even speculate that with a little more care and attention to detail, events that occurred in that area of the world may have turned out differently. Undoubtedly, events in China could not have been drastically effected to turn out otherwise; its civil war if concluded with Chiang Kai-Shek the victor still would have been no guarantee of stability on the Asian mainland. There was one exception to what might be seen as benign neglect in the region and that was Japan.

The cornerstone of Acheson’s Asian policy then was the reconstruction of Japan economically, politically, and eventually, militarily – the reintegration of a “stabilized” Asian state in alliance with the United States. In January 1950, Acheson’s speech to the National Press Club detailed the United States “Pacific Defense Perimeter” stretching from Ryukyus to the Philippines. In this chain of containment, Japan would be of primary importance.169 Unfortunately, in this speech Acheson excluded South Korea from this perimeter. Whether the omission of South Korea in Acheson’s speech was a cue to the communists (in North Korea/China/Soviet Union) that South Korea would not be contested and therefore it would be easy to invade, is a matter that is still being debated among historians.

Returning to the story of NSC-68, it should be noted that there are no direct references to specific parts of the NSC-68 document by Acheson, because at the time of his death in 1971 the document had still not been declassified and therefore, comment on its contents was restricted. Yet this does not necessarily mean that Dean Acheson was completely silent on the issue of NSC-68. Flash forward to 1958 when Acheson...
published a small tome titled *Power and Diplomacy*. Upon reviewing this work, the word *similitude* immediately would come to mind. The two works (*Power and Diplomacy* and NSC-68) differed substantially in terms of style. In his book, Acheson indulged his preference for history and literature, whereas the authors of NSC-68 (of whom Acheson was one) came with more of an industrial/military complex approach. Although there was eight years of events separating the two works, this time proved useful because it provided Acheson with an opportunity to reflect on the efficacy of strategies, policies, and programs which he had helped initiate while serving in the State Department. Differences aside, the two works, when taken together, show a strong connection to one another, a connection which speaks to Acheson’s views on appropriate foreign policy for the United States.

In the life and political career of Dean Acheson, the story that is told is one of unflagging dedication to safeguarding the interests of the United States. The strategies he employed, the motivations for his actions, the resultant policies, and the far-reaching outcomes of his decisions can best be assessed through his involvement in the formulation of several key pieces of American foreign policy: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and National Security Council-68. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program may also be added to this list as evidence of Acheson’s involvement and influence on the development of United States foreign policy.

The programs that Acheson helped create during the years from 1947 to 1950 are some of the most significant ones to occur during the Cold War period when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a tense, prolonged confrontation in which their ideas and ideals were tested and re-tested. Although in the end the United States would prove victorious in this clash of world powers, such a triumph was not preordained. To overcome their communist enemy, the United States had to engage in a process of policy making which required a significant amount of time and commitment. Acheson would be at the forefront of these policy changes, guiding and leading America in its move from a foreign policy position of benign coexistence to aggressive containment.

While working in the State Department, Acheson personally initiated, directed, and introduced policies. When not in the employ of the United States government, Acheson was actively engaged in doing whatever his part demanded to ensure that programs were carried forward. In many instances, his part demanded that he appear before Congressional committees in support of policies, such as the Marshall Plan and NATO, to ensure their adoption.

In reflecting upon Acheson’s contributions to American foreign policy, one sees that his policies have served his country’s needs well. The path taken in these instances were never easy or simple ones, and Acheson recognized that:

> The road to freedom and to peace which I have pictured is a hard one. The times in which we live must be painted in the somber values of Rembrandt. The background is dark, the shadows deep. Outlines are obscure. The central point, however, glows with light; and, though it often brings out the glint of steel. It touches colors of unimaginable beauty. For
us, that central point is the growing unity of free men the world over. This is our shaft of light, our hope, and our promise.\footnote{170}

After such a statement, who could not respect such a man and the work he engaged in for the United States?

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7. Ibid., 132.
8. Ibid., 162.
9. Ibid., 163.
11. Ibid., 188.
13. Ibid., 192.
16. Ibid., 227.
18. Ibid., 38.
23. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 120.
24. Ibid., 121.
25. Ibid., 122.
28. Ibid., 162-163.
29. Ibid., 18.
30. Truman Library
37. Ibid., 144.
38. Ibid., 151.
39. Ibid., 153.
40. Ibid., 154.
41. Ibid., 156.
42. Ibid., 152.
43. Ibid., 149 & 195.
44 Ibid., 211.
45 Ibid., 211.
46 Ibid., 246.
48 McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, 122.
49 Ibid., 110 & 114.
51 Ibid., 112.
52 McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, 107.
53 Ibid., 104.
59 Ibid., 218.
60 Ibid., 218.
61 Ibid., 219
62 Ibid. 220.
64 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 223.
65 Ibid., 223.
66 Ibid., 224.
68 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 225.
70 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 219.
73 Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy*, 84.
76 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 265.
79 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 164.
81 McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, 103.
83 McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, 103.
84 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 200.
85 *New York Times*, November 17, 1946, pg. 112.
86 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 228.
87 Ibid., 229.
88 Ibid., 228.
90 Ibid., 50-51.
91 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 228.
92 Ibid., 230.
93 Ibid., 239.
94 Ibid., 213.
95 Ibid., 236.
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96 Ibid., 239.
100 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 240.
106 Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility, 16.
107 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 241.
108 Ibid., 242.
110 New York Times, January 26, 1950, pg. 1
111 Beisner, Dean Acheson, 289.

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113 McLellan Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, 142.
114 Ibid., 137.
115 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 249.
117 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 252.
118 Perlmutter, “The ‘Neo-Realism’ of Dean Acheson,” 113.
119 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 249.
120 Ibid., 266.
123 McLellan Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, 145.
124 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 137.
125 Beisner, Dean Acheson, 133.
126 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 280.
127 Beisner, Dean Acheson, 568.
128 Ibid., 569.
131 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 285.
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137 George Washington, Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796.
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washington.asp
138 Chace, Acheson, 270.
139 Acheson, An American Vista, 60.
140 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 307.
141 Ibid., 307.
142 Ibid., 308.
143 Ibid., 308.
144 Ibid., 311.
145 Ibid., 313.
146 Chace, Acheson, 61-62.
147 Acheson, Power and Diplomacy, 37.
148 Ibid., 37.
149 Ibid., 86.
150 NSC-68, Terms of Reference. www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68-1
151 Beisner, Dean Acheson, 122.
152 Ibid., 122.
153 Ibid., 124.
154 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 347.
155 Ibid., 374.
156 Ibid., 374.
157 Ibid., 377.
158 Ibid., 377.
159 NSC-68 www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68-1
160 NSC-68 VI, A www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68-1
161 NSC-68, IX, C www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68-1
162 NSC-68 II www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68-1
163 NSC-68 IX, D. www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68-1
164 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 374.
165 Ibid., 374.
167 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 374.
168 McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, 273.
170 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 38.
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Books


Alcohol. This lone word, one of many words in the English language, can stir up multiple emotions, stories, and some (maybe hazy) memories. The culture of drinking in America differs greatly from the drinking culture in many of our European counterparts. While the Italians serve wine with lunch and dinner, the Germans take pride in their biergartens and Oktoberfest. The Irish are also known for their love of the pint or a wee bit of whisky, while the French enjoy alcohol to complement their fine cuisine. In America, those under twenty-one years of age are forbidden to consume alcohol or even be in the presence of it. In America, you can serve your country in the military at age eighteen, but you cannot enter a bar when you return home. In America, we had the temperance movement and prohibition in which both the consumption and sale of alcoholic beverages were illegal.

In a nation of immigrants, the temperance movement sought to ban a crucial aspect of foreign cultures—alcohol—during the first Gilded Age. This era in American history saw a rise in immigration as well as female participation in social issues on a larger scale. The latter grew in discussing and changing public policy, particularly through the Women’s Christian Temperance Union; these middle-class Protestant ladies associated alcohol with abusive husbands, broken families, and heathen immigrants. Thus, their desire to promote temperance stemmed from the perceived need to uphold the moral fiber of the nation beyond their role in the cult of domesticity. But what also began to rise in America during the Gilded Age were class distinctions. A nouveau riche replaced old money. A middle class began to bloom. And a lower class of immigrants crammed into cities to find work. Therefore, the temperance movement also stemmed from a desire of the middle and upper class to tame and control the lower immigrant class; they were able to use nativist fears and stereotypes to popularize temperance and prohibition. The ramifications of the WCTU’s actions still permeate our country today.

Abstaining from alcohol and the idea of temperance were not new phenomena to the Gilded Age. In colonial days, drinking was looked at with a completely different mentality. Alcohol was safer to drink than water because water could often be contaminated; doctors prescribed it as medicine for all sorts of ailments or as to pain relievers and relaxants. Don Cahalan, a late professor for the University of California at

Berkeley’s School of Public Health, also acknowledged that Puritans were not supporters of prohibition as early settlers because they themselves enjoyed drinking. As soon as they landed, they started “making beer and hard cider and wine from native fruits and berries.”\(^2\) However, as the 1700s progressed, Cahalan noted that some settlers began to advocate prohibition of distilling.\(^3\) Regulation of taverns even began to occur through taxes on alcoholic beverages as early as the 1600s.

Thus this is the beginning of America’s complicated relationship with drinking. Once the colonists became their own separate nation, talks of temperance continued in the pre-Gilded Age, antebellum period. In 1833, the American Temperance Society, stated alcohol was not “needful, or useful.” Rather, it caused bodily harm and spiritual corruption.\(^4\) At this time, the moral implications surrounding alcoholic consumption began to provide the primary drive for temperance and prohibition.

Pre-Gilded Age immigrants, especially the Irish and Germans, caused the average American (the white Protestant) to take a more impassioned stance on alcoholic abstinence which Cahalan notes began around 1850.\(^5\) The Irish and Germans were particularly fond of their drink, and anti-Catholic nativists perceived these urban wage laborers as a major threat to the country’s moral fiber. Stephen Crane’s *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets* presents the stereotype of the Irish as rowdy, proud, violent drunkards. According to author Holly Berkley Fletcher, citizens saw the influx of immigrants to be invaders in their native land.\(^6\) The 1840s saw increased “efforts to achieve legislation governing the sale and use of alcohol,”\(^7\) states sociologist Joseph R. Gusfield. During this time, the Irish were pouring into the country to escape the destruction of the great Potato Famine; the Germans entered in order to find political and economic stability.\(^8\) Both groups largely diversified the urban population, and both cultures placed central importance on tavern life.\(^9\) Americans did not understand nor attempt to understand the Irish and German cultures of alcoholic consumption and thus sought to eradicate it simply because it was “un-American.”

Religious ideas also contributed a great deal to the temperance movement of the 1820s and 30s and the later Gilded Age. Gusfield observes that this time period ushered in the “definition of the drinker as an object of social shame.”\(^10\) He writes, “Awareness in the growth in temperance organization in this period was sparked by the conversion of drinking men to abstinence under the stimulus of evangelical revivalism.”\(^11\) Indeed, many early leaders of the movement were Protestants who converted other Protestants. For example, the American Temperance society in 1826 saw its main leaders hail from

\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid. 26
\(^4\) Ibid. 27
\(^5\) Ibid. 28
\(^9\) Gusfield, “Moral Passage…” 94.
\(^10\) Ibid. 92.
\(^11\) Ibid.
Presbyterian ministry. Ministers were able to use guilt and the promise of the salvation in order to curb alcohol consumption within their flock.

Another crucial period in American history overlapped with the desire for a dry nation—the American Civil War. According to Fletcher, “...[c]onsumption of lager beer in 1865 was double what it had been fifteen years before and these numbers continued to climb through the end of the century...” She also argues that post-Civil War, temperance became “an outwardly focus for American Society” which united once divided Americans.

Post-Civil War, immigration continued and included many Eastern Europeans in addition to the Irish and Germans. Many traditional Americans viewed them as a threat to their way of life. (However, these Americans typically failed to realize their own history of immigration which included depriving Native Americans of their land and rights.) They did not speak English. They were dirty and poor. And they drank a lot. According to Richard Stivers in the introduction of The Collective Definition of Deviance, “[T]he American Temperance Movement...was less interested in preventing drinking than in asserting the cultural superiority of a native, Protestant, rural, non-drinking life-style over the immigrant, Catholic, drinking life-style.” This cultural clash made another divide in an already divided nation. According to Fletcher, the immigrant fear existed in the antebellum period but became all the more prevalent after the war in the Gilded Age “with the political organization of the liquor industry and political exploitation of immigrant communities particularly in cities.” Upton Sinclair exemplified this idea in his work The Jungle (1905). The protagonist, Jurgis, must buy a drink in order to get a free meal because his survival depends on it.

The question now lies in what role women played in this debate. Eventually, they began to exert a larger role in the movement and expand their influence beyond the cult of domesticity, because alcohol use and abuse by men affected the lives of countless mothers and children. The National Women’s Christian Temperance Union, founded in 1874, became “the first women’s mass movement in history” and “the modern world’s first large-scale, nonviolent protest movement” states Edward Behr. Comprised mostly of middle-class women who “wanted to better the working class economically, socially, and morally—even against its wish and inclination,” the temperance movement allowed them to vocalize their opinions and springboard their demand for more rights in American politics without consideration for their new countrymen.

These women felt passionate in their desire to influence society, partly because of their religious devotion. While men often considered women to be the weaker and more

13 Gusfield, “Moral Passage...”, 93.
14 Fletcher, 60.
15 Ibid.
17 Fletcher, 68.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. 46.
emotional of the two sexes, women viewed themselves as “innately more pious and pure than men.”

Thus, they saw the temperance movement as a moral obligation.

The WCTU also provided a forum for similar minded women to make a difference beyond their households by protesting, lobbying, and publicly displaying support for alcoholic abstinence, especially for immigrants. With the rise of immigration during the Gilded Age, the WCTU targeted them in hopes of improving their economic situation. To them, the reason immigrants could not improve their social standing was because they were too fond of the drink, a naïve assumption that did not take into account nativist discrimination; WCTU literature reflects this assumption as Gusfield notes:

Irish and German immigrants were often depicted in the process of reformation. Often it was the son or daughter of the immigrant who affected the process of reformation through his or her experiences with the WCTU. This type of story again presents the idea that the acceptance of temperance is a mode of assimilation into middle-class life.

This phenomenon is not specific to the women’s Christian temperance movement, however. Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Streets also stereotypes the Irish and demonstrates the inability for Maggie to break the cycle of drunkenness and poverty that surrounds her; in The Jungle, Jurgis is saved by socialism and abstinence from alcohol. With a strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the nation, the women of the movement saw an ever present need to “Americanize” and “Christianize” these foreigners. (Ironically, these immigrants were often Catholic or some other form of Protestant; the WCTU’s need to convert them demonstrates a sense of self-assuming American superiority, not unlike the attitude of the Gilded Age nouveau riche.) In addition, the WCTU worked to improve other facets of immigrant life besides temperance; the group also supported: labor reforms, child labor laws, and monetary contributions for a center to aid incoming immigrants at Ellis Island. However, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union did have “an aggressive nativist strain…during the 1880s and 1890s.” By participating in these acts, the WCTU thought they could change the immigrants’ drunken ways. But the fact that they did not form any strong connections with nativist centered groups testifies to the fact that the WCTU was not outwardly discriminatory toward immigrants; they were more interested on imposing their way—the “right way”—on those lowest in society.

According to Ray Hutchinson, the end of the 19th century saw the WCTU and

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23 “Status Conflict…” 230.
24 “Social Structure…” 594-5.
25 “Status Conflict…” 230.
26 Ibid.
“other social movements concerned with the alcohol problem in the United States” shift their focus to “prohibition rather than personal abstinence as a solution to the alcohol problem.” Prohibition was not the only issue pushed to the forefront. By asserting themselves in the immigrant experience and pushing temperance/prohibition to the forefront of American politics, the WCTU also began to promote women’s rights. Frances Willard, the second president of the union, can be credited with fusing the fight for women’s rights, her first passion, with the fight for temperance. Before helping found the WCTU in 1874, Willard served as Dean of Women at Northwestern University. In 1879, five years after its creation, Willard at age 40, became the President of the WCTU. During her tenure in office, she accomplished a great deal for the cause, especially because of her “do-everything” policy. This philosophy became the umbrella for other women’s related movements within this “powerful political force.” As President, she encouraged other women to speak publicly for religious and political causes and in so doing push the limits of gender restrictions. Clearly, Willard’s agenda would ultimately seek to include women’s rights; after all, this was a group for women run by women in a society dominated by men. In Willard’s eyes, they more than proved their capability to handle other political matters, such as voting. They were the “new women” of America. Though they valued their roles as mothers and wives, the WCTU became enamored with the ideals of the Gilded Age (which Henry Adams opposed) and liberty. Ironically, the WCTU, in demanding their rights for suffrage, suppressed the liberty of other individuals, especially immigrants, to drink what they want.

Dynamic and charismatic, Willard sought to achieve both her goals—and not just in America. In 1883, she created the World’s Women Christian Temperance Union (WWCTU). Chapters were created in countries ranging from England to Japan. The notion of a group of women worldwide united for a common cause also demonstrated growing American influence in the world. The WWCTU was the first international women’s organization; the existence of such a group, founded by Americans, seems to have been another way for them to assert a growing sense of self-importance and dominance.

But European cultures have always viewed alcohol consumption much differently than us. Europe was also not built on the backs of immigrants. Yet, the WCTU imposed its American Protestant message on the world without respecting the nature of alcohol in the more established realm of European culture and society which was also the culture of American immigrants. According to Ian Tyrell, the WWCTU met some backlash especially since the European middle class did not perceive the

28 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 77-8.
31 Yasutake, 94.
32 Mattingly, 52.
33 Ibid.
consumption of alcoholic beverages as a problem or a sin. At home, several commentators, such as Fletcher, claim that Willard worked to make the WCTU “more racially inclusive and made greater efforts to reach out to African Americans and to immigrants. The WCTU actively tried to include immigrants in their work and to counter stereotypes about them.”

The WCTU was not only a mass movement that made substantial contributions to both the goals and the accomplishments of the nineteenth-century women’s movement; it also widely embraced diverse ethnic, sectional, and racial groups. Although small in numbers, the mere presence of blacks, native Americans, and immigrants, and Southerners too (who were numerically more important), contributed to the Union’s claims to represent American womanhood.

However, others argue there was not complete inclusion. African American women had their own WCTU divisions, separate from white ones. At one point, Ida B. Wells accused Willard of changing the WCTU’s anti-lynching stance in order to appease Southern supporters. In terms of immigrants, the WCTU still viewed immigrant women as a means of saving immigrant men from the dangers of the drink. The “reformed” men could also be manipulated at the polls to legalize the cause. (We saw voter manipulation with Jurgis.) But as nativism grew in the 1890, Bordin also notes that in Willard’s “last address to a national convention she asked that Congress ‘enact a stringent immigration law prohibiting the influx into our land of more of the scum of the Old World, until we have educated those who are here.’” That statement demonstrates that helping immigrants adjust to America was not the reason women promoted temperance, but rather fear of them and condescension towards them. They were “scum” from the “Old World,” and the Gilded Age in America was creating its own world. Representing universal womanhood, the WCTU really represented the womanhood of the white American Protestant.

In terms of enacting drastic social change for the immigrant classes, the WCTU experienced great success, especially because of “the tremendous increase in immigration after 1890.” Many of them were Catholic and Jewish, who did not “patronize the WCTU,” and the further growth of cities pushed the temperance issue to the forefront of politics. The American middle- and upper-classes saw them as an even greater threat. In 1883, the nation’s states began to enact temperance laws requiring schools to teach

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35 Fletcher, 120.
38 Women and Temperance, 86.
40 Women and Temperance, 87.
43 Ibid.
“harmful physical effects of alcohol, narcotics, and stimulants.”\cite{44} They also mandated that teachers pass “an examination on the effects of alcohol and narcotics,”\cite{45} expanding their cult of domesticity to incorporate schools. While they considered this quite an accomplishment, teachers viewed the laws as an insult. They did not think the WCTU should be dictating what they should teach.\cite{46} Again, the WCTU imposed their views on another group. According to Bordin:

In 1907 the WCTU ceased endorsing textbooks and concentrated thenceforth on prize contests, the donation of reference books to school libraries, and proselytizing among teachers. But its campaign for coercive temperance education had been almost universally successful in the 19th century and was to continue as a major force in the first two decades of the 20th...certainly, compulsory temperance education was one of the more lasting effects of WCTU political activity in the nineteenth century.\cite{47}

Behr also notes that the teaching practices of temperance were “demonstrations of little scientific value but of startling impact.”\cite{48} The WCTU now wanted to send its message, regardless of scientific accuracy, to the youth of the nation. Many of these laws still exist today.

The largest “achievement” of the WCTU culminated in 1919 with the ratification of the 18th Amendment. The Amendment, which banned the sale and consumption of alcohol, went into effect in 1920. According to Gusfield, the Amendment’s passing came “at the height of immigrant cultures and at the height of immigrant influx into the United States.”\cite{49} It was successful only in that it passed. People found ways around the law, such as making their own alcohol, operating “speakeasies,” or turning to organized crime. It did not eradicate the problem; in some ways it worsened it. Because of its lack of success, the 18th amendment was repealed in 1933.

Now in the midst of what some have dubbed the second Gilded Age, the role of the WCTU, which actually still exists, may be seen as a trite joke in American society. Immigrants are no longer the focus group for temperance reform nor is women’s suffrage an issue (though they still advocate for women). The group has no interest, Gusfield says, in the “humanitarian reform of the underprivileged. Instead it is an indignation against the moderate drinker...The middle-class drinking habits are not only in conflict with WCTU norms; they are defections from past standards.”\cite{50} The class distinctions between drinkers and non-drinkers no longer exist. One example of this attack on the moderate drinker is the union’s opposition to the Amethyst Initiative which would lower the drinking age from 21 to 18.\cite{51} They see this as a terrible danger to the youth our nation; however, the youth (particularly those in college under 21) may feel differently.

\begin{itemize}
\item \cite{44} Women and Temperance, 135-6.
\item \cite{45} Ibid.
\item \cite{46} Ibid., 137.
\item \cite{47} Ibid., 138.
\item \cite{48} Behr, 39.
\item \cite{49} “Social Structure...,” 599.
\item \cite{50} Ibid.
\item \cite{51} Women’s Christian Temperance Union, “WCTU Opposes Amethyst Initiative,” WCTU, http://www.wctu.org/amethyst.html
\end{itemize}
Times are vastly different today for women and for immigrants than they were for those of the Gilded Age. Women have suffrage. They have college degrees. They are more than just housewives; sometimes they are the breadwinner. Immigrants are no longer coming in large droves from Europe; the biggest influx of immigrants is from south of the border. Though they are being targeted by nativists for other things, like illegally entering the country, smuggling narcotics, and not speaking English, alcohol consumption is not one of them. There are not as many slums now either. And workers have rights.

The legacy of the WCTU is very much embedded in our culture and seems outdated; modern society has a much different outlook on alcohol. It permeates advertisements, TV shows, college campuses, and high school woods. Class distinctions do not separate who consumes alcohol or how much they drink. The WCTU has only complicated matters, especially for college students under the legal drinking age of 21. Regardless of the American college students’ feelings, international students under our legal drinking age are no longer entitled to a right they have at home. Because of the WCTU’s views and activism in the first Gilded Age, alcohol has become taboo and rigorously suppressed in some households in the second. This mindset sometimes negatively impacts children because once they “fly the nest,” they do not always know their alcohol limits or how to drink responsibly, often making several regrettable decisions as a result. Again, the WCTU continues to impose what they consider a desirable lifestyle, not what is practical in today’s society. Less powerful groups disagree, but they are not likely to change the law because it is not a major issue in American politics. (Immigration still is, however.)

And so, underage drinkers will still continue to find alcohol any way they can. College kids will still buy fake IDs to get into bars. People will still abuse the drink. And Europe will still be a place where young adults can be treated like adults and consume alcohol as such.
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