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1066: The Norman Conquest

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Hastings: William’s Brilliance or Harold’s Misfortune

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Dr. Stow

The Norman Conquest

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The Norman Conquest of 1066 is perhaps one of the most debated events in history. Because of the outcome of one battle, Hastings, England became more involved in the tumultuous political atmosphere of continental Europe; English language and culture became forever scarred from French influence; and the kings of England (William, and his descendants, the Plantagenets), while ruling their kingdom, would, due to feudal complications, still be considered vassals to the King of France as Duke of Normandy. It is not so much the results of the Conquest that are debated but the course of the event itself: namely, to explain why William won, why Harold lost, and what means were taken by each side. There are many different interpretations on the reason for the outcome of Hastings, some of which must be discussed briefly.

One interpretation, which is widely accepted, holds that William’s brilliant generalship is the primary reason for the Norman Victory. David C. Douglas, who adheres to this school of thought affirms that “discipline, however, in the last resort, depends upon ultimate command, and the more the battle of Hastings is contemplated, the more clearly appears the personal contribution of Duke William to the final result.” R. Allen Brown, too, affirms this orthodox interpretation set down by the nineteenth century historians Freeman and Round: “They [the Normans] won, this paper would suggest, amongst other means by superior military techniques and by superior generalship.” This school has considerable merit, not only from its persistence as an orthodox view, but that it is affirmed by many Medievalists of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

On the contrary, there exists another interpretation which explains the outcome of Hastings not as William’s superiority in generalship, but in Harold’s disadvantages. Richard Glover, considered the leader of this school, affirms: “the generalship of the Conqueror after his
landing at Pevensey must surely appear in a much more creditable light, a light more worthy of the man.”

Furthermore, “the art of war in England is placed upon the road where one would expect to find it, a road closely parallel with the progress of the art of war upon the continent,” namely, that the English had at that time a proper cavalry and archers in their military institutions, along with a battle-hardened and experienced leader in their king, Harold Godwinson. Therefore, William, while a strong leader, may not have been as brilliant as others have supposed, and Harold may in fact have been as mighty a leader as William.

This paper will explore the reasons for Norman victory. Many contingent factors must be explored for a thorough analysis of William’s victory. Several tumultuous events in the years prior to the Conquest set the stage for 1066, mainly events that further complicated the issue of succession for the English throne. Assessing the organization and preparedness of each side is also key to evaluating their respective formidability. Furthermore, the course of Hastings, which ultimately determines the Victor, is also essential for an explanation of the Norman victory. At the end of this paper it will be apparent that William’s strengths in organization best explains the outcome of Hastings, and moreover the Norman Conquest.

*The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* provides a brief account for the year in three manuscripts (C, D, and E) which all focus on different areas and aspects of the year AD 1066. D perhaps provides the most detailed account, in that it provides sufficient dates, names, and occurrences, lacking the insightful analysis. *The Chronicle* is best used as a sources for chronology of events. So too, are the additional sources on the Norman Conquest of England, the most well-known being the chronicles of William of Poitiers and Robert Wace. The two, in their respective chronicles, while staying true to the events and chronology, romanticize the events in such a way that their works may be recited by bards; because of such chroniclers, much of the historical
works produced in the Medieval period are a mixture of fact and legend. Therefore, in order to produce a more thorough analysis contemporary books and articles will be used as sources for this paper.

The death of St. Edward the Confessor in January of 1066 sparks the fuse of the fateful year that would determine the progression of western European history for centuries to come. On his deathbed, the Confessor is reported to have named Harold Godwinson, the current Earl of Wessex, his heir, to which the Witan, the Anglo-Saxon regal court, approved and elected Harold to be king. How Harold attained such high status is questionable, and was most likely made possible due to the immense influence he had acquired from 1057 to 1064. Harold’s ascension angered William, who saw Harold as not only betraying his oath as vassal to the Norman Duchy, but also as a usurper of the throne to which he was rightful heir. Also hungry for power, Tostig, brother of Harold, aligned himself with Harald Sigurdsson, king of Norway, promising him the throne if he could be reinstated in his Earldom at Northumbria, from which he had been exiled by Harold. All of these complicated relationships and the political turmoil that was spawned by the death of Edward the Confessor must be further explained for an analysis to be made.

Harold was the son of the influential Earl of Wessex, Godwin, who was a relative of Cnut, the king of England preceding the reign of the Confessor. Tensions between the two factions had already been made when Cnut exiled Edward and his brother, Alfred, to Normandy in 1028, where they were protected and supported by Duke Robert II, William’s father. Alfred, deciding to venture to England to claim the throne during a period of instability, was captured by Godwin, who sent him to Scandinavia where he was killed. Stemming from this conflict, Edward could have had reserved feelings of contempt toward Godwin and his descendants, which would explain his inclination toward the Norman Duchy, and not the Earl of Wessex. Edward,
nonetheless, ascended the throne of England in 1042 as a protégé of Normandy.\textsuperscript{8} He routed out external opposition early on by diverting invasions from Scandinavia, and routed out opposition internally by banishing Godwin and his family, who had revolted against the king in 1051.\textsuperscript{9} He naturally was predisposed to Normandy, since Duke Robert had protected him and supported his claim to the English throne, as well as sending aid to Edward in order to secure his kingdom.\textsuperscript{10} Therefore it makes sense to conclude, as several sources indicate, that Edward had indeed named William his heir in 1051, and that Edward additionally held the descendants of Godwin with equal disdain due to the murder of his brother.\textsuperscript{11}

However, a year later in 1052 Godwin would reestablished himself in his earldom, returning from his exile in Flanders, with the help of his sons who sailed from Ireland, Harold being among them.\textsuperscript{12} Consequently, any hope of continuing an Anglo-Norman alliance was then lost, and all Norman forces that had been in England were routed out.\textsuperscript{13} Godwin died the following year, after which the Earldom of Wessex passed to Harold.\textsuperscript{14} Additionally, Tostig, Harold’s brother, would receive the Earldom of Northumbria after the death of Earl Siward in 1055, therefore further increasing the Godwin family’s power and influence in England. In the meantime, William had been preoccupied with dissent in his own Dukedom in which he was still asserting his power and dominance.\textsuperscript{15} From 1053 to 1057, Harold’s prestige would only rise, and by 1064 it had risen so much “that an annalist could refer to him as ‘under-king’ (\textit{sub-regulus}).”\textsuperscript{16} Due to the change of the status-quo in England during the 1050s, Edward was pressured to grant the promise of succession to Harold in William’s stead.

In 1064, Harold was sent by Edward to Normandy as an envoy, supposedly to inform William of the change in future succession for English Kingship.\textsuperscript{17} To welcome him, the Normans threw him into prison, after which he was brought to William as an honorable guest.
Harold then swore an oath as vassal to William to act as his representative in Edward’s court.\textsuperscript{18} Being in a rather awkward situation, Harold was forced to submit to William’s demand. He was, after all, in Norman territory and surrounded by William’s men; if he refused to make an oath they would have most probably killed him. On the other end, William saw Harold’s visit as an opportunity to further secure his own succession. Little did he realize Harold had held much more influence in England since the rise of the Godwin family in the latter 1050s. With the Confessor’s death nearing, Harold only had to bide his time before he would ascend to the throne, most likely knowing he would have to fight for legitimacy.

One last event sets the stage for the conflict of 1066: Tostig, brother of Harold and Earl of Northumbria, was ousted from his own Earldom during a rebellion in 1065, after which he fled to Flanders just as his father had fourteen years prior.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, Harold’s position in England was somewhat weakened, as Tostig would eventually become his enemy in the following year. However, after Edward’s death, Harold would still inherit the English throne;\textsuperscript{20} opposition to his eventual rule would come overseas, not from within the country. It is still curious that Harold’s own brother would play a part in determining the next English king.

Thus, as aforementioned, Edward the Confessor would die in January of 1066, with Harold crowned hastily after the funeral.\textsuperscript{21} Both William, who had grounds to claim Harold’s ascension as a personal offense, and Harald Sigurdsson, the Norwegian King, began making preparations for invasions that would not embark until September of that year.\textsuperscript{22} Tostig, who would return to England in May, aligned himself with Sigurdsson, perhaps with the motivation of being restored to his Earldom in Northumbria.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the players took the stage in 1066 to determine the future of English history and its future role in relation to the rest of the continent.
When considering the fifty years leading up to 1066 it can be ascertained that the realm of England was considerably unstable. David C. Douglas explains that “England, albeit comprising two ecclesiastical provinces and three great earldoms, was evidently conceived as a single kingdom whose political identity must override the differences inherent in the individual traditions of its several parts.” What is evident is that England was divisive at this point in history. At the time of his death, the Confessor was firmly established in his regal territory; however, with the Godwin family controlling much of England, along with Morcar assuming power in Northumbria in Tostig’s stead, there was much tension, as well as little that the Confessor could do. His Earls passively rivaled one another for succession, for Harold would not have ventured to Normandy in 1065 if he did not wish to win regal favor. Even before the 1060s, Edward had many problems involving Godwin and his sons disregarding his influence in 1051 and forcing their way out of exile in 1052. He also had to force his way onto his own throne after the death of Cnut, the previous king, in 1042. Therefore, it is evident that the political atmosphere in Anglo-Saxon England was not ideal for organizing under one banner. As Douglas affirms, it consisted of several separate Earldoms, all superficially under one kingdom.

The military organization of Anglo-Saxon England was deeply rooted in the Germanic culture from which it came. Each Earl has his own personal force of *housecarls*, the Anglo-Saxon elite infantry, as well as a system of calling up trained soldiers for campaigns which were typically ordered by the king. In times of emergency in which foreign invasion was imminent, a *fyrd* was called, in which five representatives from five nearby hides would meet an invading force in the battle field; this is what the learned Professor Hollister calls the *select fyrd*. The other type, which he calls the *great fyrd*, was comprised of all freemen of a particular region who, poorly armed, would meet an invading force, usually coming from the sea.
fyrd was called to combat the many Viking Invasions of England, as well as Harold’s return from Ireland in 1052. Thanes were another trained force in the Anglo-Saxon military, perhaps the equivalent of French and Norman knights. It has been suggested by the learned Richard Glover that “the weapons and equipment of the amoured men on the two sides are almost precisely the same,” therefore concluding that the Anglo-Saxons had a proper cavalry at their disposal. However, he relies too heavily on Snorri Sturluson’s saga, Heimskringla, and is also dismissive of the broad variety of William’s force. Furthermore, Hollister, in critiquing Glover’s argument, points out his inconsistency in terminology for who consists of the supposed Anglo-Saxon cavalry. Glover seems to conclude that the housecarls made up the Anglo-Saxon cavalry, but in other places refers to the Old English term cniht, which translates to knight. Hollister shows Glover is contradictory and unclear here, for he could be referring to the fyrd as a cavalry force, which is unlikely since the fyrd had no formal training period.

In regards to Hastings, Glover claims that “the new army which Harold sought to scrape together… could only be raised from a country already stripped of the materials of which armies were to be made.” When considering the organization of both the select and great fyrd presented by Hollister, Glover’s assessment seems to be lacking in information. The fyrd that Harold would have called in the North to combat Sigurdsson would have been a different force than the one he called in the South to combat William, because the organization of the fyrd was regionally based, as evidenced earlier. Harold was able to muster a fyrd force quickly upon arriving at Hastings for the purposes of defense, which he added to his own force of housecarls, amounting to around 5,000 men in total. The whole country would not have been entirely stripped of its resources. Hastings was also one of the longest battles in the Medieval period,
lasting about twelve hours in total; therefore, Harold’s force could not have been so bereft of men and supplies if they could contend with the Normans for half a day.

As a whole, Harold’s force mostly consisted of infantry, with his housecarls focused in the center, and light-armored fyrd forces and some archers on either flank. Additionally, the infantry maintained a shield wall in the front of their force, which Harold positioned on a hill near Hastings. Due to such a defensive position, without the cavalry that Glover insists on, it may have been the case that Harold did not seek to defeat William; he may have only wanted to hold William off until reinforcements could come. William, on the other hand, clearly sought to destroy Harold’s army, which was the only thing that stood between him and London.

Therefore, Norman forces and organization prove that William was both determined and cautious about his invasion of England. From an early age the task of proving his own mettle was set before William, from which he did not shy away. From 1040, when he had just came of age, to 1060, he grew in power and influence in Normandy by routing out opposition, and establishing a court of close friends and advisers in whom he could place trust. Certain instances came in which he would rival the Capetian King of France, Henry I, who would align himself with rebellious barons within William’s hold. However, after Philip I rose to the Capetian throne in 1060 at the age of eight, William would no longer have tense issues involving the King, which perhaps allowed him to prepare as much as he did for his conquest of England. Through his dealing with internal issues during the early years of his reign, William proved himself as a formidable strategic leader and also ensured the stability of his duchy, allowing him to effectively organize in 1066.
This process of organization is one that conveys both William’s caution in contending with Harold, whom he most likely considered to be a formidable opponent, as well as his own ambition for attaining an inheritance which, in his mind, had been usurped by a traitor. William’s force consisted of about 10,000-14,000 men, which he transported with approximately 700 ships, 100 to 150 of which had most likely been of Byzantine design. Out of the estimated number of men, a third of the total was cavalry, along with another significant portion of infantry archers. William had also gathered a large amount of mercenary forces from all over Northern Europe; after all, his “force at Hastings,” as Hollister attests, “was by no means a typical Norman army.” William maintained this highly organized and varying army together the summer of 1066 on the shores of Northern France, during which time he relocated from Dives to Saint-Valery and waited through inclement weather for the right conditions to cross the channel swiftly and safely. This delay in crossing proved to be an unexpected advantage for the Duke of Normandy, since Harold, who had been focused on defending his shores from an impending Norman invasion for the majority of the summer, had to travel North to battle the Norwegian King. Godwinson defeated Sigurdsson and Tostig at Stamford Bridge on 25 September, after which he marched hastily South with his remaining troops to mount a defense against William. Thus, William would land at Pevensey unopposed on the morning of 28 September 1066.

William crossed with the Norman army for the purposes of conquest, not of pillaging. He would not have conscripted such a formidable force, built ships of special, foreign design, or built fortifications upon landing if he had no intention of conquest and, afterward, permanent establishment. In addition, William also waited for Harold to come to him, perhaps a cautious move on the Duke’s part. This wariness may reveal the respect that William had for his opponent. However, when Harold’s force arrived in the vicinity of Hastings and had hastily
established itself on high ground, William moved towards the Anglo-Saxon army, capitalizing on the opportunity of contending with a battle-weary and unorganized opponent.\textsuperscript{52}

Almost all sources indicate that William made great use of his cavalry and archers during the course of Hastings (14 October 1066).\textsuperscript{53} He conducted feigned retreats with his infantry down the hill, in an attempt to lure the Anglo-Saxons towards the hill’s base, at which point his cavalry would trample over the English infantrymen who had fallen into the trap.\textsuperscript{54} The greatest mistakes for the Anglo-Saxons was their pursuit of these feigned retreats from their defensive position. If they had not, the course of the battle may have gone more in their favor. As for William and the Normans, they succeeded in making use of the variety of their army: the infantry conducted the feigned retreats; the archers would send follies of arrows into the air towards the defenders on the hill;\textsuperscript{55} and the cavalry would trample on the Anglo-Saxon infantrymen who had so foolishly pursued the retreating Norman infantry. During the course of the battle, Harold was killed; the Bayeux Tapestry and other contemporary sources depict him being shot in the eye with an arrow and trampled underfoot by Norman cavalry.\textsuperscript{56} Douglas speculates that Harold was killed by an arrow during one of the Norman follies.\textsuperscript{57} After his death, the Norman forces took the defensive position, and by then it was nighttime; the battle was over.\textsuperscript{58} The Normans were victorious.

The outcome of Hastings is best explained through Norman victory. It is true that Harold had many disadvantages going into the battle, as he had made a swift march from Stamford Bridge to Hastings in less than a month. It is also rather unusual for so many major battles to be fought in so short a period of time, especially for the medieval period.\textsuperscript{59} The size of the battles is also unique.\textsuperscript{60} However, William, who had participated in his second battle with Hastings,\textsuperscript{61} proved to be the better leader, and the Normans a more formidable force. As evidenced, he
conscripted his force from all over Normandy and Western Europe, he kept said force together from summer into fall during a period of inclement weather which delayed their crossing, he prepared diligently for Harold by building fortifications at Pevensey and Hastings, and finally he made great use of the variety of professional soldiers he had at his disposal. Harold still did prove to be a formidable opponent; if he had not, the battle would not have lasted for half a day. It was William who succeeded both strategically and tactically, capitalizing upon every opportunity that was presented to him, with which he could barely win in the end after twelve hours.

William would be crowned at Westminster Abbey on Christmas Day 1066, after which he would spend his reign pacifying the countryside and routing out opposition, just as he had done during his youth in Normandy. Thenceforth, England would become more closely tied with the political atmosphere of the continent. William’s descendants, the Plantagenets, would have to deal with the paradox of feudalism that was now in place: they would be vassal to the Capetian King of France on the continent, while King of England on the great isle.
Notes


4 Ibid.


6 Douglas, William the Conqueror, 162-163.

7 Ibid., 164.

8 Ibid., 164-165. Douglas explains on pp. 165 that Edward “owed his acceptance [as King] to the fact that he was the representative of the ancient and honored West Saxon dynasty. But he was none the less in a special sense the protégé of Normandy, where he had spent so many years of his exile, and the Norman ducal house might well feel to some extent committed to his cause.”

9 Ibid., 168. After Godwin and his sons refused to submit to the Confessor’s authority, Edward and his loyal Earls banished Godwin and his sons.

10 Ibid., 166. Also see: Miles W. Campbell. “Pre-Conquest Norman Occupation of England?” Speculum Vol. 46, No. 1 (1971), 21-31. Both sources provide evidence that there was Norman presence in England before the Conquest, and that this presence waxed and waned inversely with the influence of Godwin and his sons in the political atmosphere of England.

11 Douglas, William the Conqueror, 169.


15 Ibid. Douglas explains that William was battling with Mortemer in 1052 whilst Godwin returned from Flanders. For more about young William’s rise in power and influence in Normandy see: Mark Hagger, William: King and Conqueror (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2012), 13-32.

16 Douglas, William the Conqueror, 172.

17 Douglas, William the Conqueror, 176 & Hagger, William: King and Conqueror, 37. AS Chronicle is inconveniently blank in all versions for this year.

18 Douglas, 176-177 & Hagger, 38.

19 Douglas, 179-180.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 181-182.

22 Ibid., 184-193.

23 Richard Huscroft, The Norman Conquest: A New Introduction (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2009), 116. Huscroft also speculates at Tostig’s motivation, for they are apparently never made clear by any contemporary sources.


25 Ibid., 179-180. Douglas explains how Morcar assumed the position of Earl of Northumbria, and that the Confessor, though upset at this, was forced to allow it.


27 Ibid., 26.


29 Ibid., 26, 27, & 30.

30 Ibid., 31.

31 Ibid., 10 & 12. He refers to them as “thegns.” I will continue to adhere to the modern spelling – thane.
Glover, “English Warfare in 1066,” 4-5. Glover argues that the Anglo-Saxons and Normans had access to the same military technology; that they both had trained horsemen and archers at their disposal.

Ibid., 6. Glover argues that Sturluson is credible, and laments at how he is “treated as an unwelcome intruder into English history.” Additionally, Hollister, in assessing Glover’s argument, concludes that Sturluson was not a contemporary observer and therefore “cannot accept Glover’s hypothesis as certain” in Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, pp. 140.

Glover, “English Warfare in 1066,” 5. He refers to the Old English term cniht, arguing that “the Anglo-Saxon Chronicler unhesitatingly recognized the mounted Norman soldier as a cniht, something he had a word of his own for.” Hollister points out the contradiction on pp. 138 of Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions.

Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, 138.


Haggar, William: King and Conqueror, 47.

Douglas, 31-82, & Haggar, 1-32. Both authors trace the course of events in which William establishes himself as one of the most formidable powers in Gaul, rivaling the Capetian king of France.

Haggar, 22-26.

Ibid., 26.


Bernard Bachrach, “On the Origins of William the Conqueror’s Horse Transports.” Technology and Culture Vol. 26, No. 3 (1985): 517. Bachrach provides evidence that William’s horse transports were of Byzantine design, of which the Normans would have access due to their presence in Southern Italy. Also, Wheeler, in “The Battle of Hastings: Math, Myth, and Melee,” provides the approximated number of 700 ships, a number which Bachrach uses as one of his points; for the Byzantines were perhaps the only power at the time capable of maintaining such a fleet.

Haggar, 47.

Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, 139.

Haggar, 42-45.


Ibid., 194.

Ibid., 195.


Ibid., 242. “Once the appearance of the English army presented him with his great opportunity he took it.” Also, Douglas indicated on pp. 197 of his

Douglas, 199-203. I cite Douglas here since he provides what I deem to be the best account, supported by a wide variety of sources.

Haggar, 48, & 53-54.

Douglas, 201.


Douglas, 201. “William, it is said, ordered his archers to shoot from a distance high into the air so that their arrows might fall on the heads of the defenders, and at the same time he sent his weary horsemen once again up the hill for yet another attack. This time they were successful. It was perhaps now that Harold was killed, and now the defenders were overwhelmed, and the hill position taken.”

Ibid., 201.

Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, 148. “The fighting of three important battles in two widely separated regions within a month would be most unusual in any era. But in the medieval period it was unique, for in this age large-scale pitched battles were quite uncommon.”

Ibid.

Ibid. The first was at Val-es-dunes in 1047.
Bibliography


