Project 100,000: The Great Society's Answer to Military Manpower Needs in Vietnam

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**Introduction**

In 1966, during a speech in New York City, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that he would lower the mental and physical standards for admission into the Armed Services. McNamara based his decision on government reports which had studied the rejectees. He promised that the new program, “Project 100,000” (POHT), would uplift America’s “subterranean poor” and cure them of the “idleness, ignorance, and apathy” which marked their lives. Proclaiming that these young men “have not had the opportunity to earn their fair share of this nation’s abundance, but they can be given an opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes,” the Secretary predicted that men recruited under POHT would return to the civilian world able to earn two to three times the amount that they would have earned had they not entered the military.

Although the original announcement of Project 100,000 did not specifically mention the problems of black Americans, in a speech called “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ills,” presented to the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, the Secretary of Defense claimed that POHT was created to assist black men in overcoming a heritage of poverty and deprivation. McNamara claimed that the DOD had the “potential for contributing to the solution of the social problems wracking our nation.” He described POHT as a step towards restoring the self-respect of these men, citing high black failure rates on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, as well as Moynihan’s theory of the cycle of family poverty. An excerpt from the speech reads:

> What these men badly need is a sense of personal achievement—a sense of succeeding at some task—a sense of their own intrinsic potential.... They have grown up in an atmosphere of drift and discouragement. It is not simply the...
sometimes squalid ghettos of their external environment that has debilitated them—but an internal and more destructive ghetto of personal disillusionment and despair: a ghetto of the human spirit.⁶

McNamara announced that Project 100,000 would enlist or induct 40,000 men by June of 1966. He neglected to mention General Hershey’s declaration that escalating the war effort would require a monthly draft call of up to 40,000 men by October 1966. Perhaps he felt that the juxtaposition of those two pieces of information could lead to a line of questioning which would be uncomfortable for the Johnson Administration. In fact, his August 1966 speech gave no indication that rising manpower needs had any relationship to the decision to implement POHT. He also failed to point out that Congress had refused to fund his project, and that he planned to finance it out of the DOD’s regular budget. Instead, McNamara made four promises about the program: New Standards Men (the term for men enlisted under POHT) would receive the same basic training as regular soldiers and all the special assistance they required; New Standards Men (NSM) would be trained in skills useful in military occupations and would have access to the best technological and military specialties; NSM would learn self-discipline by absorbing the military system; and, NSM would receive veterans’ benefits after their service in the Armed Forces. Declaring that the Armed Forces had previously maintained unreasonably high standards for admission, McNamara predicted that POHT would enlist up to 150,000 NSM a year.

Virtually no historical research has been done on Project 100,000, and the Johnson Administration’s motives have remained obscure. The historical works which do mention POHT seldom devote more than a paragraph to the program, and their authors frequently accept the administration’s explanation without probing more deeply.⁷ Most military, political, and social histories of the Vietnam War fail to note Project 100,000 as a policy of historical and cultural significance. By focusing on three areas—a short history of Project 100,000, an overview of discriminatory policies in the military, and a look at the military’s treatment of rejectees—I hope to establish some basis for drawing conclusions about the Administration’s investment in POHT. The information contained in this essay is based on the small collection of available documents on Project 100,000, and should serve as an indication that a full scale study on the current status of POHT veterans deserves to be pursued.

Project 100,000 represented a landmark in both American domestic and foreign policy. The domestic policy of “helping” underprivileged blacks provided the troops necessary to carry out US
foreign policy in Vietnam. Moynihan’s theory that military training and discipline could solve poor black men’s social and educational problems gave the Johnson Administration an excuse to draft these men and send them into combat. Motivated by issues of race and racial paternalism, POHT failed in every way to benefit black Americans. Few NSM received the promised remedial education, few improved their post-war employment status, and many came home wounded; many did not come home at all.

Ironically, POHT also failed to benefit the military establishment. It provided the Armed Services with incapable, often mentally disabled soldiers. The first page of Moynihan’s report, *The Negro Family*, ends with a quote from Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma*: “America is free to choose whether the [black American] shall remain her liability or become her opportunity.” Moynihan’s use of Myrdal is ironic, as Myrdal would probably not have supported the choices which Moynihan’s report urged Johnson and McNamara to make. By creating Project 100,000, the American government made a choice Myrdal did not envision: it exploited black Americans, using them as cannon fodder while cloaking their betrayal in the rhetoric of advancement. America had turned liability into opportunity—but not for the black man.

**A Brief History of Project 100,000**

The DOD had lofty goals for New Standards recruits. Every branch of the military was told it had to accept a certain percentage of them in its quarterly quotas, with the Army required to take 25% of its quota from POHT, the Marines 18%, and the Navy and Air Force 15%. Most rejectees had failed the AFQT; under POHT the military would accept them anyway, provided that they could demonstrate over time that they had higher intellectual abilities than their test scores indicated. The DOD also specified that the training, performance, and achievement data for each NSM had to be updated bi-annually.

Between October 1966 and June 1969, POHT received 246,000 recruits. The population of POHT men differed considerably from regular servicemen; 50% of POHT, versus 28% of regular servicemen, were from southern states. The median score of POHT men on the AFQT was 13.6. If curing “ignorance, idleness, and apathy” could not be achieved on a volunteer basis, mandatory induction represented the next best alternative. 47% of all NSM were drafted.

As studies of rejectees had indicated, most NSM came from economically unstable homes with non-traditional family structures. 70% came from low-income backgrounds, and 60% came from single-parent families. Over 80% were high school dropouts, 40% read below a sixth grade level, and 15% read below a fourth grade level. 50% had
IQs of less than 85.\textsuperscript{14}

"Vietnam: Hot, Wet, and Muddy—Here’s the Place to Make a Man!” enthused an advertisement placed by POHT recruiters in \textit{Hot Rod Magazine}. The Army and the Marines stressed glamor and excitement, as well as training, as part of a soldier’s job, and many men volunteered for dangerous assignments because recruiters made them sound like adventures. SS targeted low-income ghetto areas—particularly those where high concentrations of blacks lived—for their advertising campaigns.

In Oakland, California during one year, POHT recruited 120 men from lower income groups, out of a total of 125 enlisted by SS. 90\% of these recruits had placed in Category 4 or 5 (Category 4 men were considered marginally qualified for service, and Category 5 men were previously disqualified); most of them were black or Chicano youths with police records.\textsuperscript{15} During the five years POHT lasted, an average of 40\% of NSM were black. This figure contrasted sharply with the black 8\% of the Service population. DOD certainly heeded Moynihan’s call to overrepresent black men in the Armed Forces.

Project 100,000 took in 149,000 men during its first year—an increase of 9,000 over McNamara’s original projection. After that first year, the Secretary of Defense told the public that “our Project 100,000 is succeeding beyond even our most hopeful expectations.”\textsuperscript{16}

All NSM entered regular basic training. 17,000 men took remedial reading courses in order to achieve a fifth or sixth grade reading level; 6\% took transition programs of educational or vocational training.\textsuperscript{17} After six weeks, the Armed Forces found 17\% of the men still unable to read at a fifth grade level.\textsuperscript{20} Although these men had not yet met the minimum literacy standards required by the service, they were not recycled (sent back to take the course again). Instead, they were assigned to basic combat training or special motivational platoons for extra discipline. The Marine Corps had no remedial reading program: “We are not impressed with the long term effects of a short term remedial reading program,” said a Marine Corps general.\textsuperscript{21}

In training courses other than remedial reading, POHT recruits encountered other difficulties. Continental Army Command (CONARC), which conducted technical and other high level skills courses, determined that the presence of NSM in many of these courses hindered the progress of other students. CONARC recommended that NSM be excluded from 64 of 237 entry level “advanced individual training” (AIT) courses because slow learning and comprehension abilities prohibited NSM from meeting academic course prerequisites. In 1968 the Army decided to exclude NSM from 54 additional courses because of the group’s previous poor performance and attrition rate. The Army next revised course prerequisites for 37 more courses in order to exclude NSM, before banning them from another 19 courses.
John Grant was one example of a POHT recruit. With an IQ of 66, he could not do simple arithmetic. At the age of 15 he had married his pregnant wife, and the year Grant served in the military, he went AWOL fifteen times. Kenny Matts was another POHT recruit. Retarded as the result of a childhood brain injury, Matts could not take notes or spell. After failing the Armed Forces media training course, he went AWOL. Both Grant and Matts joined the services because they were drawn to its advertised programs for disadvantaged teenagers. Gus Peters came from a broken home, left school after finishing eighth grade, and was unemployed when he enlisted. Also in poor physical condition, Peters had an IQ of 62. He scored in the 10th percentile on the Armed Forces pre-enlistment aptitude test, and later failed basic training due to poor literacy skills. Once in the service, Peters' mental inabilities prevented him from completing training as a tank driver. Ridiculed by fellow soldiers, he went AWOL and was released with an Undesirable Discharge after only six months in the Armed Forces. Demoralized and without confidence, Peters experienced much unpleasantness, and acquired no skills during his short stint in the military.

Of all AIT courses only five were restructured to accommodate POHT recruits. Even in the five restructured courses—Marine Hull Repair, Engineer Equipment, Wheel Vehicle Mechanic, Switchboard Operator, Supplyman—the Army had problems with NSM. Instructors found that NSM required more attention than other students, and more time to absorb class material, during which more competent trainees became bored. The Armed Forces was finding Project 100,000 increasingly time consuming and expensive.

By April 1968 the service found only 68% of NSM eligible for any AIT courses. Most NSM could not qualify for any advanced skills or technical specialty training; many received "soft skill" or menial jobs. The DOD, however, had another use for those NSM denied training. Over 40% received combat-related assignments, and 37% went to the infantry in Vietnam. The high numbers of black combat troops which POHT later brought to Vietnam added to disproportionate black casualty numbers.

A 1969 study by the Comptroller General's Office and the Department of the Army cast doubt on McNamara's initial assessment of the progress of POHT. Though the report, titled "The Management
of Project 100,000," called the program "a marked success," the study's conductors also publicized many negative results of POHT, and issued a number of criticisms.

The Department of the Army study found major problems with POHT training programs. NSM required enormous amounts of remedial reading training, but could not receive it because of the shortage of instructors and facilities. To remedy the situation, the Army would have had to spend a great deal of money and hire many additional personnel. Men who came into POHT under the medical remedial program had an extremely high discharge rate. Many costs associated with POHT, such as time costs and the cost of giving the other men less attention, could not be estimated. The continuous "recycling" (repetition of courses until NSM received a passing grade) which many NSM required made the reporting system impractical and deficient, since officers were reluctant and sometimes unable to complete the many special POHT reports.

The GAO had several suggestions for reforming POHT, including the recommendations that SS prevent the enlistment of men whose mental conditions demanded more than six weeks of training, and that local personnel be given adequate instructions for completing POHT reports. In addition, the GAO suggested that the Armed Forces establish reliable cost data for the training of NSM. The DOD accordingly formulated new policies for POHT. Stipulating that those who failed to meet minimum performance standards during or after training would be released, DOD specified that during the initial training phase, NSM would receive all the additional time they needed to complete the basic course. DOD also instructed Armed Forces officers to constantly monitor the individual and group progress of POHT recruits. The military establishment had gradually made impossible the realization of McNamara's initial promise of equal, specialized training and valuable experience for NSM.

Throughout the program's tenure, DOD supervisors reported that 90% of the men received excellent ratings of conduct and efficiency. The joint GAO-Army report, however, noted that faulty and inaccurate recordkeeping cast doubt upon many of DOD's claims. Many members of the military establishment, especially those who worked directly with NSM, openly criticized and disparaged the program.

Like the GAO and DOA, Armed Services officers found that POHT men needed more time—and money—than regular soldiers. Many NSM required remedial education, in addition to the basic skills taught in boot camp. In order to achieve the minimum literacy and skill levels required to advance, these men (frequently called "the moron corps" by their military peers) often had to recycle. Many NSM
never passed some of the courses, no matter how many times they recycled.

Officers complained that they had to "babysit" these men, who sometimes could not master the most basic skills, such as brushing their teeth. In an Army Times editorial, one Army officer expressed the sentiment that the services, already preoccupied with fighting, should not take on the war against poverty. The military did not have the desire, the time, the money or the resources with which to assume responsibility for such a program, regardless of the DOD's professed altruism.

At the heart of career officers' criticism of POHT was the feeling that the military—especially during wartime—should not serve as a social welfare program. Another Army Times editorial claimed that past performances by rejectees showed that the Armed Forces could only expect "poor mileage" from NSM. Many military men were aware of the results of an important study conducted by Eli Ginzburg, a Columbia University professor. Ginzburg's report, The Ineffective Soldier, examined poor soldier performance in World War 2. His conclusions should have caused readers of the Moynihan and Marshall Commission reports to regard their conclusions as doubtful. Ginzburg's results indicated that intelligence and education were important qualities in good soldiers. In fact, his findings determined that high school dropouts were five times as likely to perform poorly in battle than college students, and three times more likely than high school graduates.

In 1969, troop numbers in Vietnam began to decrease as the US de-escalated the Vietnam War. As the ceilings dropped, the number of recruits in POHT fell. Although McNamara had originally presented POHT as a social welfare program which would annually recruit up to 150,000 men, the military evidently had no desire to utilize these men in a peacetime army.

DOD cited several reasons for phasing out POHT. Revising their earlier estimations, they claimed that the program had been extremely expensive and not very successful. The Air Force, for example, spent 14% of its budget on its 14% quota of NSM, and even this was not enough, because 39% of their POHT recruits required additional funding in order to recycle basic training. Military officials explained to the DOD at the 1970 House Appropriations Committee hearings that de-escalation had reduced the numerical strength of the Armed Forces and that they had cut POHT numbers accordingly. They reasoned that if they continued to enlist 100,000 Category 4 men every year, these men would eventually constitute too large a percentage of the total troops, and would downgrade overall military standards and efficiency.

In 1970, SS set the POHT quota at 75,000. In 1971 it dropped
the number to 50,000, and in 1972 the DOD officially terminated Project 100,000. Even before the quota decreased, the Armed Forces had independently begun to eliminate more men during basic training, effectively restoring higher pre-Vietnam rejection rates. In 1968, the Marines released 6.8% of all Category 4 recruits because of mental inability. In 1969 they rejected 10.5%, in 1970 33.9%, and in 1971 46.1%. Spurred by the career military’s opposition to POHT, the Armed Services took the initiative in eliminating these men from their ranks.

The military accepted some Category 4 troops until 1977, but the DOD now asserts that the military can not serve as an appropriate environment in which to rehabilitate the disadvantaged. Recent legislation prohibits the use of mental group quotas in military recruitment. Unfortunately, the military reached these conclusions too late for many NSM.

Almost all Category 4 soldiers entered the services under POHT. Their court-martial rate was 3% (as opposed to 1.4% for the control group of other soldiers) while their rate for nonjudicial punishments was 13.4% (as opposed to 8.2% for the control group). Studies showed that Category 4 soldiers were three times more likely than other soldiers to go AWOL during basic training, twice as likely to receive early discharges, and two-and-a-half times as likely to be court-martialed. One third of NSM (approximately 360,000) were discharged for absence or disciplinary offenses. Of these, 80,000 of them received Dishonorable, Bad Conduct, or Undesirable Discharges, and 100,000 of them received General Discharges. Some 36,000 POHT troops were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged before serving their first eighteen months.

While many NSM came home disabled, and many others died, those who returned physically intact faced the same difficulties as other Vietnam veterans in terms of employment, emotional and family instability, and post traumatic stress disorders. Because a large percentage of NSM experienced combat, stress disorders may be even more widespread in POHT veterans. The difficulty many veterans faced in finding post-war employment was exacerbated in the cases of the many POHT veterans who had received less than honorable discharges. Deprived of promised training and education, these men had little prospect of earning the doubled or tripled income which McNamara had promised them.

Because McNamara insisted that the military avoid stigmatizing these men, their records contained only cursory indications of their status. This poor recordkeeping initially resulted in many NSM failing to receive special training, and later receiving no special attention from the Veterans Administration. The VA has repeatedly denied
many benefits, even on appeal, to the numerous POHT men who received less than honorable discharges.

McNamara also demanded that NSM should never be informed of their unique status, so that they would not feel as if they were government charity cases. The long-term result of this ignorance is a group of men who cannot fight for the special treatment they deserve because they do not know who they are.

The injustices suffered by POHT veterans were intensified in the cases of black NSM. Since 40% of POHT men were black, their post-war activities are included in various studies of black veterans. In 1969, when the Armed Forces released their first group of POHT recruits, the unemployment rate for black veterans was 8.5%. The rate rose to 16% by 1971. Although unemployment rates among black veterans dropped to 14% in 1972, during one month of that year it was as high as 22%. In 1972, while the overall rate for black vets had dropped to 11%, the rate among black veterans between the ages of 20 and 24 was 16.3%. As 21 was the average age of NSM through POHT's tenure, by 1973 most of them would fall in the 20 to 24 age group. It seems likely, then, that POHT men contributed significantly to high unemployment rates among black Vietnam veterans. Project 100,000 certainly failed to accomplish one of its primary stated goals: the "uplifting" of black males.

**Blacks and the Military**

The US Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1963 that "Negro servicemen believe on balance that the Armed Forces offer them greater career opportunities than they can find in the civilian economy." In a 1965 survey, 40% of the black men questioned listed self-advancement as their reason for enlistment. Some all-volunteer airborne divisions were 24% black. Until 1967, black reenlistment rates for all service fields except communications and intelligence, technical specialties, and medical and dental were between 47% and 49%. Observing these statistics, Moynihan viewed the military as "a socializing experience for the poor... until their environment begins turning out equal citizens." But pre-1967 rates of black enlistment and re-enlistment may not have been indications of black patriotism—black men may have had few other available options.

Moynihan did not realize that for many black soldiers, the "socializing experience" of the Vietnam-era soldier would come in the jungles and deltas of Southeast Asia. In 1963—the same year in which the Commission on Civil Rights claimed that the military offered black soldiers great advancement opportunities—20% of all personnel assigned to combat were black. Some black men volunteered for combat in order to earn higher wages for high risk assignments. More
frequently, however, the lower educational and technical skill level of black enlistees and draftees led to infantry duty.

The disproportionately high number of black men in combat units translated into disproportionately high casualty and death rates. While black Americans represented 11% of the population and 8% of the military between 1961 and 1966, they comprised 16% of all combat deaths in Vietnam. In 1965, 23.5% of all Army personnel killed in action were black. The DOD attributed unusually high black casualty and death rates to the frequency with which black men volunteered for elite combat forces like Airborne or the Green Berets, but overlooked the fact that many of these men qualified for no positions other than infantry duty. Between 1965 and 1970, blacks comprised 9.3% of total active duty personnel in Vietnam, yet they suffered 12.6% of the deaths. Black death rates exceeded by 35.5% the rates for all servicemen, and exceeded by 30% the rates for those men in Indochina.

The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service found large discrepancies between draft rates for blacks and whites. In 1966, 30.2% of blacks who joined the service were drafted, as opposed to only 18.8% of all whites. The Commission hypothesized that black men were less likely to enlist because fewer of them were admitted into the reserves and officer service programs. As a result, blacks comprised a larger percentage of the draft pool. Commission figures confirmed this lack of representation in the reserves, revealing that only 2.8% of all nonwhites had any reserve duty experience, while 15.5% of all whites had some. An even more startling figure showed that only 0.2% of all nonwhites, versus 3.3% of all whites, were admitted into officer service programs. Clearly, the equality and opportunity which many ascribed to the Armed Forces was more illusion than reality.

The Commission's report moved the DOD to instruct that admission standards for the reserves be identical to those for regular service. The reserves were a point of political controversy; critics asserted that many college students and other potential deferees enlisted in order to fulfill a patriotic duty and, at the same time, avoid going to Vietnam. Anti-war protesters, who included civil rights activists, college students, and others who felt the war was morally or politically insupportable, claimed that the reserves served as a haven from combat duty. In order to demonstrate the reserves' exclusivity, the protesters cited the minute percentage of black men in the reserves, and compared that number to the high percentage of black men in combat. The DOD sent 3% of the reserves to Vietnam to serve as support troops in 1968, hoping to offset antiwar criticism, but the nature of the reserves was not substantially altered. By the end of 1968, over 100,000 men had signed up for the National Guard waiting
list, and at that time only 1% of the reserve forces were black.\textsuperscript{46}

Further investigation of Armed Forces' policy toward black Americans revealed that discrimination began even before these men entered the service. The Armed Forces consistently rejected black men at a higher rate than they rejected white men. Over half of all blacks failed to meet military standards: black males comprised 11% of the US population of 18-21 year olds, and less than 5.5% of these men qualified for military service.

Both the AFQT, which determined mental fitness for service, and the exam for deferment contained implicit biases towards whites. In addition, if a black man passed the AFQT and wanted deferment for educational reasons, he had to pass the draft deferment test. An official from Science Research Associates (the company that lost the bid for the draft deferment test design to Educational Testing Services) claimed that "the test is culturally weighted to favor the white, middle-class and upper-class student, as are all tests of this type."\textsuperscript{47}

Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York recognized the test's racial bias in 1966, predicting that

An excessively disproportionate number of those failing would be black students. The draft deferment test brings the circle of racial discrimination full cycle. First, we provide an inferior education for black students. Next we give them a series of tests which many will flunk because of an inferior education. Then we pack these academic failures off to Vietnam to be killed.\textsuperscript{48}

Other critics of the military's testing policies questioned the tests' accuracy at determining standardized "dimensions of achievement across different groups."\textsuperscript{49} The draft deferment test qualified candidates on the assumption that the highest scorers would be most successful in their chosen career paths, although a 1964 Columbia University study showed that academic achievers were more likely to attain lower levels of professional achievement.\textsuperscript{50} The AFQT, critics claimed, failed to measure "idealism, stamina, persistence, and creativity."\textsuperscript{51}

L. Mendel Rivers, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, commented on rising military manpower requirements, stating "The Army is good for a man's soul."\textsuperscript{52} In 1965, 230,991 souls were improved by the draft, and in 1966 their numbers rose to 331,000.\textsuperscript{53} Rivers' view of the Army as a reforming institution may have had some effect on the decisions of local draft board members, who inducted a startling percentage of qualified black men. Though 94.5% of the men who qualified for the draft were white, black men made up 8% of the military overall—and 11% of the military personnel in Vietnam. The black draft rate increased at a much faster rate than did the general
draft rate. Although black citizens comprised 11% of the American population, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service cited studies which showed that, of qualified men, 30% of blacks (in contrast to 18% of whites) were drafted.54

In 1967, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service revealed additional unbalanced induction figures for men with military experience: 27% of white men and 42% of black men with military experience were drafted.55 Racial imbalances like these occurred because of institutionalized policies of discrimination at the local level—especially in southern states.

October 1966 figures show that only 1.3% of all local draft board members were black. Seven states had no black draft board members, including Mississippi, where 42% of the population was black. Blacks were also unrepresented on draft boards in Alabama (30% black population), Louisiana (31.9% black population), and South Carolina (34.8% black population).56 The state Governor appointed draft board members, who frequently lived in wealthy districts far from their jurisdictions, and had little contact with community members. Racial discrimination on some local boards went further than a simple lack of representation—the New Orleans draft board had one member who had also served as the head of the Ku Klux Klan.57

Most black leaders were acutely aware of the military’s discriminatory policies, and were incensed by Moynihan’s suggestion that the Armed Forces could improve the status of black men by “socializing” them. To many, the idea that black men “deserved” larger military participation seemed a transparent excuse for sending even more black men to die in Vietnam. The white administration had seemingly developed the perfect cover for a genocidal campaign against black Americans. In his essay “Hell No, Black Men Won’t Go,” Gayle Addison, Jr. recalled a World War 2 newspaper editorial which he felt expressed the United States’ current intentions in Vietnam. The Waterbury Times opined:

It seems a pity to waste good white men in battle with such a foe. The cost of sacrifice would be nearly equalized were the job assigned to Negro troops.... An army of nearly a million could probably be recruited from the Negroes of this country without drawing from its industrial strength or commercial life....59

The complaints of black leaders were many and varied. The money spent on the war and defense, some argued, could be better spent to alleviate American domestic problems. Black men were fighting to help Vietnamese secure freedoms which black citizens did
not have at home in America. There was a strong sense that black Americans were being robbed of their future, that the “talented tenth” of black youth were being shipped off to die in Vietnam. Eldridge Cleaver saw serious global repercussions to the black image:

> It is no accident that the U.S. Government is sending all those black troops to Vietnam. Some people think that Vietnam is to kill off the cream of black youth. But it has another important result. By turning her black troops into the butchers of the Vietnamese people, America is spreading hate against the black race throughout Asia.... Black Americans are considered to be the world’s greatest fools to go to another country to fight for something they don’t have for themselves.

One-Third of a Nation: Rejectees and Army Policy

Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor and Chair of the President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation, opened the 1964 report One Third of a Nation with a letter lamenting the fact that “Fully a third of the age group does not meet the required standards of health and education. Far too many of these young men have missed out on the American miracle.” In the year of the report’s publication, 1,400,000 men turned 18. According to report estimates, one-third of them would be disqualified, for some reason, from participation in the Armed Services. The Task Force concluded:

> Of persons who have recently failed the mental test... a major proportion of these young men are the products of poverty. They have inherited their situation from their parents, and unless the cycle is broken, they will almost surely transmit it to their children.

The rejectee group of 1964 consisted of about 600,000 men, and the correct conclusion that most of these men had grown up in poverty was based on the similarity of rejectees’ background characteristics. Most of these men had little education: 40% of mental rejectees had only completed elementary school, and 80% had not finished high school. 50% of the rejectees came from families with annual incomes of less than $4,000, and 20% came from households with annual incomes under $2,000. 70% of rejectees came from homes with more than four children and 50% came from homes with more than six children. A 1963 poll published similar statistics: of 2500 rejectees, 30% had left school before the age of 17 in order to support themselves or their families. (Half of all rejected black men cited this reason for leaving school.) The 1963 poll revealed that 21%
of the rejectees came from families who had received public aid during the past five years; 14% of them presently received public aid. 31% came from families in which the parents had divorced or separated, and 9% of these men had court records.67

Investigations at the time of the poll determined that these men had not escaped the poverty environment in which they had matured. 31% of rejectees were unemployed (a figure four times that of the average 18 year old male), and those who did work held low-skill, low-paying jobs.68 Rejectees earned almost one-third less than the average income of all those in their age group; they had an annual income of $1,850 while their peers earned an average of $2,656 a year.69 Based on these figures, the Task Force concluded that those who failed to qualify for the Armed Forces had a high chance of failing in other areas of life.

Altogether, including those disqualified for mental and physical reasons, 49.8% of men tested in 1962 failed to meet Armed Forces standards. Of those men who took the AFQT in 1962, 306,073 failed the intelligence tests: “It was determined that they lacked the mental equipment to be able to absorb military training within a reasonable time. The most common deficiency was apparently that they could not read or do simple arithmetic.”70

In addition to these depressing statistics, the report gathered some hopeful figures. Of the 2500 rejectees polled in 1963, the majority of both employed and unemployed men expressed a willingness to obtain additional training and education, even if they had to leave home to obtain it. The rate of willingness of black men greatly exceeded that of whites, with 78% of working black men, and only 56% of white men, desirous of more education. 85% of black men looking for work wanted training and remedial education, while only 74% of their white peers wanted these opportunities. Even among those not actively seeking employment, 79% of blacks and only 59% of whites were ready to leave home to receive training. A nationwide survey of rejectees found 96% of nonwhites desirous of basic education and job training.71

The Task Force suggested that: “The President should announce a Nationwide Manpower Conservation Program to provide persons who fail to meet the qualifications for military service with the needed education, training, health rehabilitation, and related services that will enable them to become effective and self-supporting citizens.”72 Three years later, the Marshall Commission echoed the Task Force’s call for national programs to help rejectees, but it gave the job of manpower conservation to the Pentagon. While educational and training programs for these men were included in the Task Forces’ initial recommendations, these programs were not the primary goal of the Marshall Commission’s plan. Its goal had shifted from assisting
rejectees to achieving “the objective, insofar as it proves practicable, of accepting volunteers who do not meet induction standards but who can be brought up to a level of usefulness as a soldier, even if this requires special educational and training programs to be conducted by the Armed Services.”

The National Advisory Commission report offered no less bleak an image of American rejectees than its predecessor. Figures published in 1965 showed that 62% of rejectees failed for physical and mental reasons, while 38% failed because they were not judged to meet a vague and flexible “moral” standard. Marshall Commission race-based statistics agreed with those of the earlier report: 49.7% of black men and 24.7% of white men in the 26 to 29 year old age bracket were judged unfit for service. The National Advisory Commission report also found that low income slum areas had the largest percentages of rejectees and the least percentages of student deferments.

The Marshall Commission generalized its conclusions, and predicted that a man was likely to fail the AFQT if he had less than an eighth grade education, or if he was a black high school dropout. The report cited the fact that so many American men failed the AFQT and other minimum standards tests as a “national security risk” and emphasized that unfitness was a result of “the years of their youth and development, in conditions of poverty and discrimination, inadequate education, and poor medical facilities.” The Commission’s investigations had begun months before McNamara made public his plan for Project 100,000, but the report was released seven months after the announcement. The report strongly supported the DOD’s new program, claiming that it would train men and improve their condition once they had entered the service.

The Commission tendered suggestions which directly contradicted the conclusions of Ginzburg’s 1950 report, The Ineffective Soldier—a report taken very seriously by the post-World War 2 military, and which had originally spurred the Armed Forces to adopt the AFQT. The AFQT was designed to measure mental ability, and to screen out men unable to acquire military skills. If a man scored in the passing range on the 100 point test, and he qualified for no deferments, he was ranked 1-A. Those who failed the test, but scored between 10 and 30 received the ranking of 1-Y, and were placed in Category 4. (Categories 1, 2, and 3 automatically qualified for service. Category 4 was marginally qualified, and Category 5 was automatically disqualified.) Most Category 4 men were disqualified from service during periods of peace, since the Armed Forces could then afford to be discriminating. During periods of conflict, however, men who had received a 1-Y ranking had a good chance of being accepted by the military, since SS had to expand the pool of qualified men in order to
meet military manpower needs.

Historically, Armed Forces admission standards have fluctuated with the manpower demands of wartime and peacetime. The AFQT was designed as a measuring device; a way to classify men for military induction. For example, during World War II and the Korean War, when available men were scarce, the overall military rejection rates were 30% and 37% respectively. During the peaceful period in the early 1960s, before the US had committed its forces to Vietnam, rejection rates rose from 49% in 1961 to 57.9% in 1964. By December 1966, the preinduction rejection rate had dropped to 34%.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the military made a great effort to prevent the enlistment of men who could potentially cause disciplinary problems, have psychiatric disorders, or might otherwise fail to meet the Armed Forces’ rigorous mental and physical demands. The number of men in the Armed Services with 5 to 8 years of education dropped from 23.6% in 1953 to 10.8% in 1959, while the percentage of men with 12 years of education rose from 35.3% to 53%. Department of Defense officials explained the changes:

This raising of intellectual standards can be regarded as an important factor in decreasing non-effectiveness, since in the past the prisoner group contained three times the proportion of individuals with an eighth grade or less education than the general troop population. Also it is a reasonable assumption that individuals with lower intellectual capability have greater difficulty in adjustment than persons of average intelligence and thus more frequently become psychiatric problems or disciplinary offenders.

During this same period, the Armed Forces maintained a high rate of less than honorable discharges, as it eliminated men who had disciplinary problems and were not needed during peacetime. A study by Army psychiatrists explained the rationale for these higher rejection and discharge rates: “The smaller and cadre-type Army in peace time has less opportunities for the utilization of marginal personnel.”

1965 was the first year in more than a decade to see military rejection rates fall. In this same year, many began to question the validity of the AFQT. “Perhaps the military criteria for physical and mental fitness,” conjectured one congressman, “is simply a more convenient way for them to eliminate the numbers subject to the draft which is in excess to their needs.” Other critics expressed indignation at the falling rates, insinuating that during times of low manpower needs, the Armed Forces denied rehabilitation and training to men with limited skills and physical ability, but during times of high need—
wartime—these same men were inducted, enlisted, and hastily trained for combat. When SS devised the 1-Y classification in 1962, General Hershey defined 1-Y men as “not too objectionable for war, not perfect enough for 1-A in peacetime, but acceptable in an emergency.”

Conclusion

McNamara’s goal when he founded POHT was to admit 40,000 former rejectees in 1966, and 100,000 more each year. More than 300,000 men joined the Armed Services as New Standards admittees between 1966 and 1971. Because most of these men could not attain the skill level for special technical training, over 40% of them were assigned to combat units, and in the Army and Marines, over 50% of them went to Vietnam. An estimated 10% of New Standards men were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged in the first eighteen months of their service. Although the whole premise of the Project 100,000 program was to provide education and training for these men, only 7.5% of them received any remedial education and skills training. In 1971, because of high costs, waning manpower needs, and de-escalation in Vietnam, Project 100,000 ended.

Project 100,000 assumed the guise of a social program with the primary goal of helping black youth and reconstructing “the fabric of black society.” In reality, the Johnson administration, the DOD, and the Armed Forces used Project 100,000 to further their own agenda by sending over 100,000 NSM (about 50,000 of them black) to fight and die in Vietnam. The Administration had little time and money to devote to the war against poverty and the campaign for civil rights. But by adopting the paternalistic hypotheses of selected government reports, Johnson and McNamara constructed the pretense of Project 100,000. Not only would the program provide soldiers to produce the body counts on which the Vietnam War focused, it would also temporarily eliminate pressure on the administration to show its support for civil rights.

The past and present discrimination experienced by blacks in the military might have indicated that the Armed Forces were not the ideal environment in which to nurture a new generation of black men. The Ginzburg study had revealed that rejectees would not be soldiers of great potential and ability. And already, disproportionate numbers of black men served, fought, and died in Vietnam (along with poor men of all races). The Ineffective Soldier should have served as a warning to the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service that if it focused on the mentally and socially disadvantaged it would not find a reasonable and just answer to the question “Who shall serve when not all shall serve?”
After POHT's inception, the DOD should have discerned that the program would not be successful. Repeated cases of desertion, disciplinary problems, mental incompetency, and physical incapacity should have alerted the DOD to the fact that POHT was not an overwhelming success. But as long as the Vietnam conflict required troops, the Pentagon persevered in its insistence on the program's soundness.

Project 100,000 also played an important political role for the Johnson Administration. By enlarging the pool of prospective draftees, the Administration could continue the war in Vietnam without calling in the reserves or drafting college students. Since college students served as the voice for anti-war protest, POHT permitted Johnson to avoid arousing increased protest from that group. NSM were neither vocal nor politically inclined, and many of them welcomed the Armed Forces' guarantees of training, education, and excitement.

Project 100,000, although profitable to the Administration, benefitted none of those whom it professed to help. As the Marines' self-imposed release rate of POHT men and the antagonism on the part of career officers illustrates, NSM were more often a nuisance than a benefit to the military. Nor did most of the poor and uneducated minorities recruited by the program come home better educated or more self-confident. Black POHT veterans returned from Vietnam to the same poor conditions as other Vietnam veterans.

By making the black family the scapegoat for America's racial problems, Moynihan had given the administration an excuse to send unreasonably high numbers of black men to war. Moynihan's theory provided Johnson with a way to avoid implementing more practical, useful, and fair methods for alleviating black poverty. Many of the black families whom Moynihan claimed POHT would benefit had to contend, during and after the war, with the grief of losing family members, emotional traumas caused by combat, injuries, unemployment, and social instability, in addition to the trials of poverty and American racism. Project 100,000 did not help to solve the problems of poor black Americans: it compounded old problems and created new ones.

1 The basic foundation upon which this decision rested was the January 1964 report, One-Third of a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service, prepared by the Presidential Task Force on Manpower Conservation, which was headed by Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Moynihan. The report stated that every year almost 600,000 young men, or about one-third of the 1.8 men eligible for service, were found "unfit" because they failed the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The report also found
that a high proportion of these men belonged to minority groups. In 1965, DOD records reported that 56% of all black men failed the AFQT. One Third of a Nation concluded that Black men failed the AFQT primarily because they suffered from educational disadvantages. This argument was logically extended in the 1965 Moynihan Report on the black family. Assuming that poor education and academic performance on the part of many black men was only a symptom of a disturbance in “normal” family relations, the Moynihan Report hypothesized that service in the Armed Forces represented the best way to boost the self-esteem and confidence of black men. Under a section headed “The Armed Forces”, the authors of the 1965 report stated:

Service in the United States Armed Forces is the only experience open to the Negro American in which he is truly treated as an equal.... It is an utterly masculine world. Given the strains of the disorganized matrifocal family life in which so many Negro youth come of age, the Armed Forces are a drastic and desperately needed change: a world away from women, a world run by strong men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if limited, are granted on the basis of performance. The theme of a current Army recruiting message states it as clearly as can be: “In the U.S. Army you get to know what it feels like to be a man.”


3 Ibid.  
5 At a planning conference for a study on black Americans, sponsored by Daedalus and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Moynihan made known his opinions on the state of black America: “I think the problem of the Negro family is practically the property of the American government. I mean, we spend most of our money on this... in health, in welfare, and on employment, and yet we know nothing about it.” [Rainwater, Lee & William L. Yancey. The Moynihan Report & the Politics of Controversy (Boston: MIT Press) 1967: 75.] In March 1965, Moynihan produced his controversial report, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. The report concluded that, because of a history of discrimination and lack of opportunity, the black American family was deteriorating. This breakdown, said the report, resulted from the fact that American society disempowered black American men, who consequently could not support a typical patriarchal family. Moynihan, in different sections of the report, summarized the situation:

At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society
is the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental source of the weakness of the Negro community at the present time.... In essence, the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well.

The report documented the black family's "instability" by reporting high fertility rates, incidences of teenage pregnancy, welfare dependency rates, divorce, separation, and desertion rates, and unemployment rates. Black Americans, Moynihan explained, were trapped in a "tangle of pathology": high crime rates, narcotics addiction, and alienation from white society. As a result of this "unsound" familial and social structure, black children, in Moynihan's estimation, lacked proper role models and thus had no aspirations to rise in American society. Moynihan contrasted black families with the typical white family who, "despite many variants, remains a powerful agency... for transmitting... valuable contracts of the world of education and work."

When the Department of Labor unofficially released the Moynihan Report in 1965, both government officials and civil rights leaders hastened to criticize it. Citing the report as incomplete and overdrawn, Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, Whitney Young of the National Urban League, Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP, and John Lewis of SNCC criticized both the report and Moynihan. The report, they complained, focused on socioeconomic measures, and not antidiscrimination. Despite the expert status attributed to him by the white political and social establishment, Moynihan had few contacts with the black community or the civil rights movement. Furthermore, he fit the stereotype of the "white liberal", against which militant and separatist groups such as the Black Muslims rebelled. Ignoring the criticisms of many black leaders, Johnson and McNamara embraced Moynihan's conclusions.

The report suggested several solutions to the problem of the black family, including universal employment for all black men (which Moynihan proposed could be achieved by placing black men into traditionally female jobs). He also recommended housing and birth control programs. By focusing on statistics and de-emphasizing the continuing impact of economic and social discrimination, Moynihan could maintain his narrow focus on the problems of the black family. Accordingly, he also suggested limited solutions. Ultimately, his most influential and dangerous suggestion was that the position of the black male could be strengthened if he were offered greater opportunities in the Armed Forces.

Moynihan's focus on the Armed Forces as a solution to the problems of the black family was not coincidental. The year before the report on the black family was issued, Moynihan helped lead the Task Force on Manpower Conservation, which produced One Third of a Nation. Service in the Armed Forces, or "The American Miracle", as Task Force Chairman Willard Wirtz referred to it, seemed to Moynihan an ideal solution to the poor education,
employment prospects, and social status of black men, and to the increasing manpower needs of the Vietnam conflict. In 1964, black Americans comprised 11% of the population, but only 8% of the military. Moynihan carried his proposals further in his 1965 report, stating:

The ultimate mark of inadequate preparation for life is the failure rate on the Armed Forces mental test. A grown man who cannot pass this test is in trouble. 56% of Negroes fail it. This is a rate almost four times that of the whites.

Military service is disruptive in some respects. For those comparatively few who are killed or wounded in combat or otherwise, the personal sacrifice is inestimable. But on balance, service in the Armed Forces over the past quarter-century has worked greatly to the advantage of those involved. The training and experience of military duty is unique; the advantages that have generally followed... are singular, to say the least.

Despite the fact that by 1966, the number of black troops in Vietnam was commensurate with their proportion of the population, Moynihan believed so adamantly in the advantages of military service that he advocated even greater black participation. The 1960s' single most important psychological event in race relations, he contended in a 1966 *New Republic* article,

was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV screens of America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one of the oldest known routes to social equality.... Moreover, as employment pure and simple, the armed forces have much to offer men with the limited current options of, say, Southern Negroes. By rights, Negroes are entitled to a larger share of employment in the armed forces and might well be demanding one. (Rainwater 33-34)


6 McNamara: 101.

7 Many accepted authorities on the Vietnam War, such as Stanley Karnow and Gloria Emerson, fail entirely to mention Project 100,000 in their accounts of the conflict. In addition, several authors who do include POHT in their studies accept the Administration's line without question. For example, Rainwater and Yancey's *The Moynihan Report* mentions POHT only as a by-product of the study; they fail to attach any importance to it. Jean Carper's *Bitter Greetings* considers POHT as an example of the draft's unfairness and does not question McNamara and Moynihan's belief that these men were capable of becoming good soldiers. Baskir and Strauss' *Chance and Circumstance* contained the only in-depth assessment of the motives behind POHT. Interpretations critical of the project are generally found only in books
and essays dealing with inequities experienced by blacks in the military—such as Binkin and Eitelberg’s *Blacks in the Military*.

Project 100,000 represented the second attempt of the Johnson administration to create a program with the goal of inducting under-qualified men into the Armed Forces. In late 1964, Johnson directed Selective Service to steer pre-induction rejectees into federally sponsored non-military assistance programs. This experiment, coined Project STEP (Special Training and Enlistment Program) tried to provide remedial job training skills and job referral services, with the goal of raising rejectees to the educational skill level of normal soldiers. Ostensibly, they would receive training, get jobs, and also meet military qualification standards. 134,000 men participated in Project STEP, which proved a disappointment in three ways. First, of 134,000 letters written to prospective employers by the rejectee group, only 20% were answered. Second, the program referred less than 4% of the men for jobs; 2,200 men eventually got jobs, while only 189 participated in job training programs. Third, Congress refused to provide the $10 million which the Pentagon requested to fund Project STEP. This program, which used the DOD as a tool for implementing domestic social programs, marked the President’s first attempt to use the military as a vehicle for his domestic policies. It would not be the last time such an attempt failed. [Baskir: 125]


McNamara made this last requirement impossible to fulfill, however, since he adamantly insisted that NSM should not be stigmatized by their designation. NSM were never informed who they were, and a common service number, which in 1967 became an alphabet code, was the only indication that a recruit came from POHT. Nevertheless, poor physical or mental performance generally made these men easy to identify. NSM came to be known by their military peers as “the moron corps” and “McNamara’s idiots”.


Ibid.: 90.

Ibid.: 34.

Baskir: 129.

Ibid.: 128.

McNamara: 102.

Baskir: 122-123.

Ibid: 127.

Ibid.


Comptroller General: 20.

Between 1968 and 1970 the costs for POHT more than doubled. In 1968, the GAO estimated the cost for the entire program at $5.2 million. By 1969 the
The cost grew to $11.2 million, and by 1970 it was $12.8 million. [Binkin: 128]

Comptroller General: 28.


Comptroller General: 16.

Baskir: 126-127.

Figley: 349.

Baskir: 123.

Starr: 195.

Baskir: 130.

Starr: 196.

Starr: 195.

Baskir: 129.

Figley: 348.

Starr: 201.


Ibid.

Ibid.: 161.

Baskir: 125.


Ibid.


Starr: 187.

Ibid.


Figley: 348.

Testing bias is also indicated by the fact that many black college students failed the exam. The majority of these students attended college in the deep South, where most black colleges were located. In 1966, 32% of all students failed the draft deferment test in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; 47% failed in Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee. These figures stand in marked contrast to the 7% failure rate for New England students, and the 10% national rate. In its testing policies, the military failed to consider that low academic performance might be a result of differences in educational opportunities, rather than low mental ability. Selective Service officials admitted that the deferment test favored math and science students over those in the liberal arts. Most black colleges at that time, emphasized neither the sciences nor the liberal arts, however; they trained students in technical and trade skills, which were not included in the deferment test at all. The Armed Forces also overlooked the racial, cultural, and economic discrimination which existed within the educational system—discriminatory practices which restricted black students from schools and programs which specialized in the academic subjects privileged by the exams. [Carper: 76]

Ibid.: 89.

Ibid.: 77.

Binkin: 89.

Carper: 47.

Report of the National Advisory Commission: 156.

Clyde Taylor's *Vietnam and Black America* contains a collection of essays by noted civil rights leaders which detail the decisions of some movement leaders, and many movement followers to oppose Vietnam War policies. Reasons for protest range from a concern with the future of black Americans, to a concern with national and international policy.

The inclusion of the "moral" category in these figures demonstrates an interesting phenomenon: an overwhelming number of black men were rejected on the basis of mental or moral inadequacy. The rate of black disqualification for physical reasons was actually lower than the regular national average. [Report of the National Advisory Committee: 22]